

Current History

JULY, 1959

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New States of Africa

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Current History

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JULY, 1959

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As the nations of Africa attain maturity and independence, United States foreign policy, according to our introductory article, will have to meet the challenge of dealing "with an independent Africa, which will still be poor while we are rich, black while we are white, and agricultural while we are industrial." In this issue, we discuss the problems that the new states of Africa face in developing their separate and independent ways.

A United States Policy for the New Africa

By VERNON MCKAY

*Professor of African Studies, School of Advanced International Studies,
The Johns Hopkins University*

THE widely publicized outbursts of rioting in British and in Belgian territories in 1959 dramatize the need for a more alert United States policy in Africa. These disturbances are an outgrowth of the same historical movement that inspired a remarkable series of precedent-setting international conferences held in Africa by Africans in 1958. Were it not for the fact that history plays so many tricks on the dead, one might suggest that these conferences make 1958 a turning point in African history.

Bringing many hundreds of African political, labor, educational and other leaders together, these jubilant international meetings included the *first* Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Conference which ended in Cairo on January 1, 1958; the *first* Conference of Independent African States in Accra in mid-April; the *first* Conference of North African Political Parties in Tangier at the end of April; the *first* Pan-African Students Conference at Makerere College in Uganda the week of July 1; the *first* conference of the Confederation of North African Students in Tunis in August; the *first* meeting of the Pan-African Freedom Movement for East

and Central Africa in Tanganyika in September, and the *first* All-African Peoples Conference in Accra in December.

Why are these seven African conferences of 1958 significant? In what respect do they symbolize a possible turning point in African history? The answer lies not only in their unusual numbers and the batteries of anti-colonial resolutions they adopted. Even more important is the fact that all seven of them established permanent bureaus or secretariats to carry on the fight for their goals. It is of major significance that large numbers of Africans are now able to get together in different regions of their own continent to see each other's countries and discuss each other's problems. The exchange of ideas and emotions through these new contacts is an invigorating and fortifying experience. It symbolizes a new force in African history—the growing power of Africans to speak for themselves in world councils, rather than relying on Asians and other outsiders to speak for them. This new force is perhaps most evident in the United Nations where a bloc of nine independent African states, soon to be joined by several others, has already forced

the colonial powers to modify their attitudes. When the advancement of Africans was demanded by Arabs and Asians in the United Nations, Europe could to some extent tell Asia to mind its own business. It is impossible to give the same response to Africans.

The Africa conferences of 1958 are also memorable because all seven of them adopted resolutions which in one way or another were Pan-African in spirit, indicating possible new combinations of African states. During the past decade the "Balkanization of Africa" has often been deplored by spokesmen of the colonial powers and occasionally by Americans who worried about the emergence of many weak states. It is now clear, however, that the Balkanizers of Africa are not only nearing their objective but are beginning to worry about it themselves. It is perhaps ironical but nonetheless encouraging that leaders of British and French Africa, including Prime Minister Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, are today warning against the "dangers of Balkanization." Africa is alive with new ideas for regional combinations varying from tight political unions to loose economic organizations. These important developments are worthy of study and encouragement.

Implications for American Policy

What are the implications of these revolutionary innovations for United States policy in Africa? Although political change is already faster than was expected by even the most advanced observers five years ago, the cumulative effect of combined internal and external pressures will doubtless accelerate it further. An effective American policy will be extraordinarily difficult to achieve in this fluid situation because it requires continuous and simultaneous action on four main fronts—in Africa, in Europe, in the United Nations and at home. Particularly important, because it affects every step we take on any of these fronts, is the underlying need for the United States—not only government officials, but educators, business men, religious leaders, congressmen, labor leaders, and civic groups—to develop the right general attitude toward Africa.

What are the main criteria of such an attitude? First of all, we must accept the fact that the future of Africa will be shaped

for the most part by Africans, either in cooperation or conflict with Europeans. Today it is Africans such as Prime Ministers Nkrumah of Ghana and Sekou Touré of Guinea who are beginning to redraw the map of Africa, a role once played by Bismarck and Lord Salisbury. Secondly, we must realize our own limitations and, in particular, the limits of foreign policy as a means of changing things outside our control. Thirdly, the new Africa is certain to be full of surprises for all of us (including the Africans themselves), and we must not be overly disappointed when today's policy proves to be out of date tomorrow. In the fourth place, we need a deeper understanding of the basic fact that Africans and their cultures are not inferior, but only different. There are far too few Americans who realize that the traditional societies of Africa are not simple, but very complex indeed. Finally, an active policy with a sense of urgency is needed, but we must carry it out with a relaxed attitude of patience, forbearance and an appropriate degree of humility.

With this general attitude in mind, what specific steps might be suggested to improve United States policy? In this article, only brief mention can be made of the main lines of a suitable Africa policy on three of the four fronts already mentioned. *In Europe*, further diplomatic overtures are needed to persuade our friends to consider our views about the nations of Africa. *In the United Nations*, where African issues often excite deep emotions, our best policy is to maintain a general position independent of both the colonial and the anti-colonial blocs, while supporting as broad as practicable an interpretation of the United Nations Charter. *At home*, our knowledge of Africa and our machinery for dealing with African affairs need much improvement, but perhaps most of all we need to repair our badly tarnished image as "the land of the free and the home of the brave." The latter task requires not only the improvement of race relations in the United States, but also the liberalizing of our immigration, passport, visa and other policies.

Turning to policy opportunities in Africa itself, one must bear in mind at the outset the dangers involved in any generalizations about a vast and diverse continent with more

than 50 territories and 800 languages. No doubt it will become increasingly necessary to devise policies to deal with specific African areas and situations, as is already evident in regions of white settlement such as South Africa. In certain political, economic and educational activities, however, policy suggestions applicable to most of Africa can be made.

Relaxation of Political Pressure

In the political field, our most promising opportunity at the moment is to relax pressure on Africans to join the Western camp. Such clichés of the cold war as the "battle for men's minds" and the "uncommitted nations" have outlived their usefulness. The trouble with the slogan "battle for men's minds" is that it seems to imply that Africans must somehow lose their minds to either the Russian or the American mentality. And that is just what African leaders don't want to do. They want to be distinctively African. The phrase "uncommitted nations" is even more outmoded because Africans made it abundantly clear at the international conferences they held in 1958 that they *are committed* to the neutralist, or non-alignment, or non-involvement idea of a distinctively African personality making itself felt as a force in world affairs.

The most we can reasonably hope for is that Africa's new leaders will decide upon neutrality with a Western orientation. The current ferment of nationalist, Pan-Africanist, and related ideas indicates that many Africans may become as sensitive to American or Russian pressure as they are to that of Western Europe. The most influential great power in the new Africa may therefore be the power that succeeds in making its influence and its presence felt in the most unobtrusive way.

On the controversial colonial question there is little room for dramatic and positive American action. Our basic support of the principle of self-determination is inevitably clouded by our ambiguous position in practice. The critics who blame Western defense interests for this ambiguity are only partly right. It is also the result of our growing realization that new colonial policies since World War II have produced impressive

political, economic and educational advances in preparing Africans for self-government. Fortunately our dilemma on colonial issues, caused by our need for friends in both Europe and Africa, is declining as colonies disappear. Let us not rejoice unduly, however, because new dilemmas, perhaps even more severe, may confront us in learning to deal with independent Africa, which will still be poor while we are rich, black while we are white, and agricultural while we are industrial.

Expansion of Economic Aid

Our best opportunity in Africa lies in the economic and educational, rather than the political field. We can help both Africa and the United States by assisting the new and emerging states in building economic and educational foundations for political freedom. In doing so, we should bear in mind that the conditions essential for the really successful operation of democratic institutions are not likely to exist in most of Africa in the foreseeable future. We should continue to foster democratic ideals, best of all by strengthening American democracy, but we will undermine our own objectives if we succumb to cynicism when new states fall short of these ideals.

The most we can reasonably hope for in the new Africa is enough political stability to make possible, with foreign aid, the eventual attainment of a self-sustaining stage of economic growth. If the new states can attain this stage, it may then be possible for their peoples to have the freedom of choice necessary to strengthen their democratic ideals and parliamentary institutions. The most important single step we can take in Africa today, therefore, is to expand our economic aid and technical assistance program.

There is admittedly a contradiction in the above argument if it is true that the most influential great power in the new Africa may be the power whose influence and presence is the least obtrusive. We cannot expand American aid without making the American presence more obvious. This is simply another of the dilemmas we must learn to live with.

When the honeymoon of independence is over, the new states of Africa are certain to enter a period of economic disappointment and frustration. Since human beings every-

where look for scapegoats the vulnerability of the United States to emotional criticism is likely to mount in direct proportion to the expansion of the American presence. A good example is the anti-American rioting in Bolivia in March, 1959, which was partly motivated by "the feeling that too many North Americans are working here on programs that are not coming up to expectations."¹

Despite this danger, the risk involved in expanding our aid to Africa is smaller than the risk of doing little or nothing. Let us therefore accept the dilemma and concentrate on improving our methods of extending aid in such a way as to minimize the objectionable qualities of the American presence. Although there are no easy ways of minimizing our presence while expanding our program, three steps might help toward this end.

First of all we need to improve the training of the administrators and technicians in our aid projects in order to broaden and deepen their understanding of African areas and peoples. An African training program for United States officials in the International Cooperation Administration, now under consideration, could be of real value.

Secondly, we must combat our conscious and unconscious tendency to exaggerate the merits of American "know-how" and efficiency. In judging between what Africans want and what we think they need, we have a tendency toward a "Daddy knows best" attitude that is not far from the paternalism of the colonial relationship against which Africans are now rebelling. The more we are able to meet reasonable African requests, the more effective our policy is likely to be in the long run. This depends partly on the skill and tact of individual officers in attaining the happy medium, but it might also require a policy decision in Washington to give higher priority to psychological factors in aid projects of debatable economic value. The sharp eyes which our taxpayers and Congressmen focus on I.C.A. projects make this easier said than done. This is a good illustration of why Congress and the public must develop the right general attitude toward Africa. Our officials can't do it alone.

The third method that might help to minimize the American presence in Africa is

a continually increasing degree of international cooperation in aid projects. A co-operative approach seems to me of cardinal importance. Not only are Africa's needs too great for us to meet alone, but cooperation has values of its own which should benefit all concerned. If we are closely linked with other nations in aid projects, moreover, we may run less risk of an ultimate African reaction against the United States.

A cooperative approach in aid projects could be undertaken in two main directions. The first is to increase our contributions to the economic aid and technical assistance funds of the United Nations and its Specialized Agencies. Aid from the United Nations, as many observers have reiterated, is psychologically more palatable than aid from a single power because it lessens African feelings of dependency. Since Africa's needs are too urgent and extensive for the United Nations to satisfy, however, we might supplement United Nations efforts by exploring the possibility of new forms of multilateral cooperation. One possibility might be a regional economic organization or plan for Africa, initiated by Africa's independent states. They might, for example, invite the United States, India and the Western powers with African interests and experience to join them in creating an elastic multinational organization within which special bilateral and multilateral arrangements could be negotiated and coordinated. African states would participate on a basis of complete equality and might be donors as well as receivers of aid. In addition to channeling capital into Africa, a new multinational organization might operate some form of international civil service.²

The grave shortage of administrative and professional personnel in the new Africa will make the recruitment of foreign technicians necessary for many years. What we need is a new method for transferring power to Africans on terms which make it mutually satisfactory for white administrative and technical personnel to continue in service until Africa has trained its own specialists. This requires a system that provides con-

¹ Juan de Onis in *The New York Times*, March 12, 1959.

² A thought-provoking elaboration of this idea is found in Arnold Rivkin, "An Economic Development Proposal for Africa: A New Multilateral Aid Organization," *International Organization*, Vol. XII, No. 3, 1958, pp. 303-319.

tinuity of service, security and a multiracial *esprit de corps*.

An organization of this type might absorb the structure, personnel and functions of the eight-power Commission for Technical Cooperation in Africa South of the Sahara and the related Foundation for Mutual Assistance, as well as the African work of the Overseas Territories Committee of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation. These organizations have done valuable work but are psychologically ill-adapted to the needs of the new Africa because they are considered an outgrowth of the age of colonialism.

If the creation of such a comprehensive organization proves impractical, fruitful cooperation on a smaller scale would be profitable. For example, in the emerging states of West Africa formerly under British rule, there are many opportunities for effective cooperation. An excellent illustration is the recent appointment of a nine-man team, including three Nigerian, three American and three British experts, to analyze the higher educational needs of Nigeria. This could be a pilot project of great importance. Nigeria and Ghana are not hostile toward the United Kingdom, and the British have a wealth of experience which we lack with the economic and educational development of Africa.

Educational Opportunities

In addition to the relaxation of political pressure and the expansion of economic aid through cooperative methods, an effective United States policy for the new Africa should place a high priority on the expansion of our educational exchange and assistance programs. Public and private educational exchange projects which bring Africans to the United States and send Americans to Africa are a broadening and deepening experience of immeasurable value. Even if economic aid backfires, the more Africans there are who know Americans as personal friends, the more difficult it will be to build up a stereotype of the United States as a money-grubbing giant with no appreciation of aesthetic and spiritual values.

It is essential to win the confidence of African intellectuals, using the term in the broadest sense to cover leaders in all fields. It is they who set the patterns for Africans to

follow. It should not be forgotten that Communist strategy and tactics place a high priority on winning the student movements along with the intellectuals who set student fashions.

The fact that African leaders and students have suffered from racial discrimination in the United States is worrisome, but much has been done and can still be done through private efforts to improve this situation. Moreover, a recent study of the reaction of Africans to their treatment in the United States indicates that they generally reveal considerable sophistication. Racial discrimination has not destroyed their appreciation of America's qualities. One of Ghana's latest postage stamps portrays Nkrumah looking at Lincoln's Memorial in Washington, a much happier bit of symbolism than if it were Lenin's Memorial in Moscow.

In addition to educational exchange programs there are outstanding opportunities in other forms of educational assistance. The International Cooperation Administration has made a grant to the Royal Technical College in Kenya, has helped to create a College of Agricultural and Mechanical Arts in Ethiopia, has sent survey teams to Eastern Nigeria and to Tunisia to investigate the possibility of American aid in establishing

Vernon McKay resigned as Deputy Director of the Office of Dependent Area Affairs, September, 1956, to organize a program of African studies at the School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, D. C. From 1936 to 1945, he taught history at Syracuse University; from 1945 to 1948, he wrote on colonial problems for the Foreign Policy Association; and from 1948 to 1956, he worked on African problems in the Department of State, Office of Dependent Area Affairs. A member of many United States delegations to sessions of the United Nations Trusteeship Council and General Assembly, he has published numerous articles dealing with this area. At present, he is making a sixth trip to Africa on a one-year grant from the Ford Foundation.

new universities, and has fostered a number of other African educational projects. An increasingly important role in educational assistance is also being played by American private organizations, including missionary groups, business corporations, universities, and philanthropic foundations. Private agencies can do many things more effectively than governments.

The Main Challenge

The main challenge to United States policy in Africa is saliently summed up in important statements made recently by friendly chiefs of state in two of Africa's new countries. In the October, 1958, issue of *Foreign Affairs*, Prime Minister Nkrumah of Ghana wrote: "We have to modernize. Either we shall do so with the interest and support of

the West or we shall be compelled to turn elsewhere. This is not a warning or a threat but a straight statement of political reality." In July, 1958, President Bourguiba of Tunisia said: "As long as our pro-Western policy bears fruit we shall not change it. Let us meet again in four or five years and compare the results" with those of "some of our Arab brothers in the East who think that their situation calls for assistance from Soviet Russia."

It would be hard to find plainer and more direct statements of the basic need for economic and educational aid to strengthen the policies of Africa's friendly leaders. The test of our quality as a nation lies in our capacity to carry such burdens with patience and forbearance.

"... But I think it is remarkable that the Near East in this decade or two is escaping out of the Middle Ages and into the 20th Century at such a rapid rate. Governments are becoming more responsive to the needs of the people, and development is going forward at a really accelerated rate.

"And there will be greater development. It is a good time for business and industry to study the Near East in the hope of sharing in the surge of development which will come. Thought should be given to imports into this country from the area, to the development of the tourist trade, and to the development of joint projects with local companies. ...

"One hopes that we can develop the theme of trade—not aid in the Near East. Aid does not always accomplish its objectives. Aid can be a useful handmaiden of policy, but is certainly no substitute for policy. Some people seem to believe that such mechanisms as military or aid pacts can win peoples. I don't think this is true. Two countries of the Near East have refused to accept our aid—Syria and Saudi Arabia. A small amount of aid has been given to Lebanon, some to Jordan. Considerable aid has been given to Egypt but is now suspended. Tremendous aid has been given to Israel, and used well. In general the Arab world—the neighbors of Israel—have received little aid, usually in the proportion of equal aid to Israel as compared with the 7 or 8 countries of the area with perhaps 20 times the population. So aid isn't a weapon that we can successfully use.

"Now, just what is the problem?

"... It is a human, a psychological and a political problem. What we see in places like Egypt are the manifestations of the problem, the symptoms of the disease. Nationalism has surged in the Near East, sometimes in an unreasoning, belligerent and hysterical manner and Nasser has become its symbol.

"... We must above all reassert American leadership in the Near East. We had it once—a valuable, and precious asset. We must understand that Asia and Africa are going to play an increasing role in the world. While we cannot jeopardize our Western European alliances, neither can we ignore the growing importance of the countries of Asia and Africa. This may prove to be a difficult task of compromise and reconciliation."

—Harold B. Minor, Former Chief, Middle Eastern and Indian Affairs, United States Department of State, in an address delivered March 25, 1957.

"In point of fact," writes this observer, "few nations in the world have started off with such a paucity of natural resources as Libya." Nonetheless, he notes that "after centuries of foreign occupation, the people of Libya value their independence above everything else."

Libya: Experiment in Independence

By HENRY SERRANO VILLARD

Former United States Minister to Libya

WHEN THE independence of the Kingdom of Libya was proclaimed on Christmas Eve, 1951, few persons believed that an ideal solution had been found for the disposition of this erstwhile Italian colony. Trusteeship in one form or another, rather than complete freedom as a sovereign state, had been the solution preferred by the victors in the Second World War. The concept of Libya as an independent Arab nation was entirely new and, for some, a dubious adventure in nascent nationalism.

That Libya stands today as a political entity in its own right, well started on the path of progress and of orderly development in self-government, has confounded the skeptics. Its continued existence, in spite of a grave deficiency in natural resources and in the face of certain internal disruptive tendencies, is indicative of a strong national will to fulfill the cherished ambitions of sover-

eignty. Under the wise and temperate leadership of King Idris the First, the country has steered a cautious course through the treacherous waters of international politics and gives promise of peace and stability within its borders as the years roll on.

With only a little more than a million inhabitants, according to a United Nations census in 1954, the 680 thousand square miles of desert which compose the three provinces of Libya—Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and the Fezzan—are of interest to the world chiefly because of their geographical location. Directly across the Mediterranean from Italy, Sicily and Greece, this recently emerged Arab Kingdom on the rim of North Africa is bounded on the east by Egypt; on the west by Tunisia and Algeria; and on the south by the evolving territories of French West and French Equatorial Africa and by the Sudan. A glance at the map shows how, from time immemorial, Libya has played a strategic role in history and has more often than not lain athwart the path of conquest.

At the dawn of Libyan history, the indigenous inhabitants of Tripolitania (generally of Berber stock) saw Phoenicians from the commercial ports of Tyre and Sidon settling colonies at three major points along the coast. Toward the end of the sixth century, Tripolitania passed under the control of neighboring Carthage. Then came the Romans, followed by the Vandals and the Byzantines. The Arab invaders of A.D. 643, ten years after the death of the Prophet Mohammed, left their imprint on the populace to a greater degree than those who had come before, or than the Normans, Spaniards, Turks and Italians who succeeded in turn.

Henry Serrano Villard entered the Foreign Service of the United States in 1928 and has served at posts in the Near East, Africa, South America and Europe. He was the first chief of the State Department's Division of African Affairs, and the first U.S. Minister to Libya (1952-1954). In 1955 he was detailed as Deputy Commandant for Foreign Affairs at the National War College and is at present U.S. Representative at the European Office of the United Nations and Consul General, Geneva, Switzerland. He is the author of *Libya, The New Arab Kingdom of North Africa*.

The Barbary pirates, who made their mark in American history, used Tripoli as their headquarters.

In Cyrenaica, the first colonizers were Greeks; then followed Egyptian overlordship and Roman rule. While under the loose suzerainty of the Ottoman Turks, the vilayets of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica were attacked by Italy and surrendered by the Treaty of Lausanne in 1912, to become the foundation for Mussolini's dream of empire two decades later.

Italy's North African domain was not fully pacified until 1932, when a facade of civilian character was created by the Fascists over the basically military pattern of their colony. In the Second World War the Libyan desert was the scene of the see-saw struggle between the Allies under General Montgomery and the Axis under General Rommel. The last chapter in the long tale of conquest and reconquest was written in 1943 when the North African campaign was brought to an end. British military authorities assumed responsibility for the 770 thousand odd inhabitants of Tripolitania and the 280 thousand inhabitants of Cyrenaica, while the French assumed temporary custody of the scant 40 thousand living in the Fezzan. It was an ironical twist of fate that, because of the inability of the victors to agree among themselves as to the division of the spoils, Libya in due course was set free and launched upon a fully sovereign and independent existence.

The problem of the post-war disposition of the Italian colonies was a thorny one. From the start, it was evident that any final or lasting solution would require the consent of the four great powers who had administered defeat to the Fascists: the United States, the United Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union. When the Potsdam conference took place in 1945, the Big Four were agreed upon one point and one point only in this connection, namely that there should be a provision in the Treaty of Peace with Italy under which Italy would renounce all rights and title to her African possessions, including of course the sprawling colony of Libya. This historic renunciation was incorporated in Article 23 of the Treaty; it recognized, in effect, the wartime declaration of Foreign Minister Anthony Eden in the House of Commons on January 8, 1942, that the Sen-

ussi tribesmen of Cyrenaica, who had actively cooperated with the British forces, would "in no circumstances again fall under Italian domination."

Under Annex XI of the Italian Peace Treaty, the victorious powers agreed to determine the future of Italy's former possessions within one year from the coming into force of the treaty, failing which the question would be referred to the General Assembly of the United Nations. The Treaty was signed on February 10 and ratified on September 15, 1947, so that the one year interval began to run from the latter date.

As a replacement for the League of Nations mandate system, the United Nations' plan of trusteeship seemed a logical answer to the question of Libya's future. In September, 1945, the Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in London began a round of discussion on the future of the Italian colonies which was not to end for three years. A Commission of Investigation, sent out by the four powers in 1947 to assist in reaching a decision, produced separate and conflicting reports regarding "the wishes and welfare of the inhabitants and the interests of peace and security" as specified under Annex XI. The British proposed a British trusteeship for Cyrenaica; the French suggested an Italian trusteeship for Tripolitania and a French trusteeship for the Fezzan; Soviet Russia proposed a Soviet trusteeship for Tripolitania; and the United States backed a plan for direct administration by the United Nations over a period of ten years, after which independence would have been in order. Each meeting on the subject ended in deadlock.

Independence

When all the variations on the theme of trusteeship were exhausted, the Council of Foreign Ministers judged that the time had come to drop the problem into the lap of the United Nations General Assembly which met in Paris in 1948. The arguments reached a climax during the session held the following year at Lake Success, when instead of four foreign ministers, a babel of voices debated the merits of one solution or another. Here the notorious "Bevin-Sforza" plan was disclosed—a secret agreement for British trusteeship over Cyrenaica, Italian trustee-

ship over Tripolitania, and French trusteeship over the Fezzan, causing an indignant outburst among the so-called "anticolonial" nations and demonstrations in Tripolitania. Finally, as if in recognition of its inability to reach agreement on trusteeship, the General Assembly on November 21, 1949 voted 48 to 1, with nine abstentions, to wash its hands of the whole affair and to grant Libya complete independence "as soon as possible and not later than January 1, 1952."

In the intervening period, a transitional regime under the tutelage of a Commissioner appointed by the United Nations—Adrian Pelt of the Netherlands—began the intensive task of preparing Libya for existence as a new member of the family of nations. In the United Nations resolution of 1949, it had been provided that the constitution and ultimate form of government for Libya would be determined by representatives of the people meeting in a pioneer National Assembly. The Commissioner, under whose supervision the machinery for self-government was prepared, had the help of a ten-member Advisory Council: an international body composed of one representative of each of the three regions of Libya, one representative of the Libyan minorities and one representative of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Egypt and Pakistan. A preparatory Committee of Twenty-one, chosen by the Commissioner and the Council and broadly representative of all groups in the country, was set up as the first stage in Libya's advance to statehood.

When the members of the Provisional Assembly met in Tripoli on November 25, 1950, they took the formal decision that their state should be a federation, that it should be a monarchy and that the crown should be offered to Sayed Mohamed Idris El Senussi of Cyrenaica, a reputed descendant of the Prophet and spearhead of the long drawn-out resistance against the Italian occupation that had begun during the war of 1911–1912. The Assembly, made up of 20 members from each of the three territories of Libya, worked hard and long with the help of the Commissioner, the Advisory Council and a number of experts, to turn out the Constitution of 213 articles; that document set up a bicameral parliament and defined the duties of the ministry. Modeled on the

constitutions of 17 other countries—notably on that of the United States—it provided for proportional representation in the lower house; and, in the upper house or Senate, equal representation for the three territories—with half the number to be appointed by the King and half to be elected by their respective legislative councils. Each area was designated a province under a Wali, or governor, representing the King. The Cabinet Ministers were declared responsible to Parliament, with exclusive powers over such matters as foreign affairs, defense and currency, while with the legislature lay overriding power in shipping, sub-soil wealth and foreign trade.

Such careful steps in the direction of self-determination, which taught Libyans the rudiments of democratic procedures, paid off in gratifying fashion before the two year time limit set by the United Nations. On October 7, 1951, the Provisional Assembly adopted the Constitution it had framed and was ready to proceed to the first popular elections. With barely a week to spare, the Libyan government—a constitutional monarchy under the Senussi leader, Emir Idris—took the reins into its own hands and began to function as an independent entity on December 24, 1951. In accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, elections were held immediately after independence, although not without some disorder and bloodshed.

The Libyan people had come of age. They had never experienced any form of political freedom before, and had never exercised the privilege of parliamentary processes. Yet the representative body which met for the first time in Benghazi in the spring of 1952 showed that in spite of the flash of violence at the polls, it had quickly absorbed the basic lessons of representative government.

One provision of the Constitution which led to difficulties in the early years of independence was that Tripoli and Benghazi should be twin capitals of equal rank. In the effort to weld together the disparate provinces of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica and to create a united nation out of their divergent interests, it had been necessary to compromise between the claims of Tripoli, the commercial center and the only good port, and of its rival in Cyrenaica, homeland of King Idris.

The result was a last minute bargain to establish two capitals. While jealousy still exists between the two, and thereby furnishes a potential source of friction, the costly expedient of moving the legislature and ministries from one to the other has given way for the present, at least, to recognition of Benghazi as the current seat of government.

Farming under Handicaps

The economy of Libya is founded on scarcity. Most of the country is arid desert, and only along the Mediterranean coastline in the north is there sufficient rainfall to permit even a subsistence economy. A primitive handicraft industry and a few modern plants left by the Italians were all that the embryo state could boast of outside its traditional agricultural and pastoral activities. In point of fact, few nations in the world have started off with such a paucity of natural resources as Libya.

As if to justify its seizure of the country from Turkey, the Italy of the First World War advertised its new-found colony as an outlet for surplus population and as a source of undiscovered agricultural and mineral wealth. However, only a scattering of Italian families went to live in the Libyan wastes before the country was pacified; only a few more abandoned their homes for Africa thereafter, until the Fascist government embarked on ambitious schemes of colonization. Despite the warning of earlier experiments that the great barren stretches were unsuitable for cultivation, scores of peasants from southern Italy and Sicily were settled by Mussolini in subsidized communities throughout the northern part of the country. There they were furnished with concrete houses, as well as tools and seed grains. Each community was supplied with a church, a school, a police and first aid station, and, of course, a political propaganda or party headquarters. The same construction program formed the nucleus of existing towns and villages—to all of which an independent Libya fell heir. The well-built Italian edifices, not to speak of paved roads and public utilities, were no mean legacy for a nation that began its existence almost destitute.


Italian industry was responsible for the hundreds of acres of olive trees, and of almonds, dates, lemons, oranges and grapefruit

which constitute a basic feature of the Libyan economy today. Less successful, perhaps, was the attempt to have Libya live up to its reputation as the granary of the old Roman Empire. The most promising of all the Fascist development schemes was in the wide and fertile Barce plateau, part of the highlands of Cyrenaica, where the *Ente per la Colonizzazione della Libia* built 1800 houses in the midst of a natural agricultural or grazing area. The problem of irrigation, however, here as elsewhere, must be successfully solved before returns commensurate with the investment can be expected.

Although barley and wheat can be raised in adequate amounts during a normal season, there is often a deficiency which must be made up by imports from abroad. Above all, the farmer must contend with an ever-recurring phenomenon known as the *ghibli*—a mercilessly hot, dry wind from the Sahara which in a few days or even hours can shrivel a grain crop into a field of worthless straw or kill off an orchard of budding fruit trees. Absence of rainfall and lack of water for irrigation, combined with this devastating blast of air from the south, are the natural enemies that must be overcome before Libya's produce can be sure of a profit.

Some 45,000 Italians who chose to go on living in Tripolitania have done much to service the community, both in farming and in commerce. There is little for the new Arab landlords to develop, however, in the way of exports. Except for the making of salt from the sea, or the collection and sale of salvaged war material from the desert (if that can be called a business enterprise), industrial activity was strictly limited when Libya entered upon statehood. Exports consist principally of olives and citrus fruits, a few hides and skins, a medium grade of wool, a small quantity of tuna fish and sponges, and esparto grass—used in the making of high-grade paper and banknotes, and the one product of some importance. Added to the devastation left by the Second World War, which almost obliterated such cities as Tobruk and badly wrecked Benghazi, the obstacles facing the youthful nation on the road to self-sufficiency seemed formidable indeed.

It is, in fact, difficult to conceive of greater handicaps than those faced by this offspring



of the United Nations on the day of its birth. Near the bottom of any economic scale, the per capita income stood at approximately \$30 a year. Only 16 Libyans held university degrees, and some 90 per cent of the population was illiterate. Disease—trachoma in particular—was widespread; while a high birth rate was offset by an infant mortality of three out of ten babies. Save for the coastal highway built by Italian imperialism over a distance of more than a thousand miles, communications were virtually limited to camel tracks and an aerial link with Italy and Cairo. The standard of living was so low that many of the poverty stricken natives, one third of whom are nomads, subsisted on 1,500 to 1,800 calories of food a day and spent 80 per cent of their income for food.

While considerable improvement has taken place in each of the above categories, circumstances such as these cannot be changed overnight. A miniature boom has begun, however, in the search for oil—and therein lies the great hope of Libyans for the future. Thanks to an enlightened petroleum law, drafted shortly after independence, a dozen foreign companies have obtained concessions in the last few years and started exploratory drilling. The results so far have not been conclusive, but encouraging evidence of the existence of oil has been found in Tripolitania and the Fezzan and, more recently, in Cyrenaica. The United States, the United Kingdom and France are represented in the current race, which in itself has contributed substantially to the Libyan economy through

the expenditure of dollars, pounds and francs in the country. There is no doubt that the production of oil in commercial quantities would help the desert to bloom and would lay a firm foundation for the state's growth. The Libyan government, therefore, is doing everything it can to facilitate the explorations, which must cover vast expanses of sand dunes and desiccated territory still infested with land mines left from the war.

Libya's Value for the U.S.

To the Western world, Libya is of exceptional strategic value. Wheelus Field, an extensive American airbase on the outskirts of Tripoli, is a vital link in the network of defense points against possible aggression. Tens of millions of dollars of American money have been invested in this installation, the advantage of which can easily be seen from the map. Furthermore, the presence of American airmen and their families is a factor of the utmost significance in the economic life of Libya. About \$8 million annually is spent by the United States Air Force on the purchase of local foods and services, and many Libyan employees have received practical instruction in a gainful occupation, such as that of garage mechanic.

Under the terms of an Economic Assistance agreement signed in 1954, at which time American rights to the air base were ratified, the United States is contributing \$40 million to Libya's economy over a period of 20 years. Further aid from the United States comes through the American contribution to an economic development association in which the United States and Libya are engaged jointly in the familiar "Point Four" type of operation; through United States participation in the United Nations Technical Assistance program; through contributions to special projects handled by a Libyan-American Reconstruction Commission; and through substantial periodic grants of relief wheat. Altogether, it is estimated, the American contribution in one form or another amounts to about \$25 million a year. In addition, Libya is receiving from the United Kingdom, with which it has a treaty of alliance, over \$9 million a year to cover budgetary deficits. Thus a sizeable subsidy is available to the Libyans from Western

sources, not only for agricultural development, but for the construction of badly needed highways, schools, electric power stations, irrigation projects, and for harbor improvements.

Libya looks generally to the West for its orientation in world politics. In September of 1955, however, relations were established with the Soviet Union and a Soviet Ambassador soon reached the country. Offers of economic assistance from the U.S.S.R. have been dangled before Libyan eyes, in whose hungry view economic or financial aid from the West is, understandably, never enough. So far, however, the Russian camel has not proceeded to get its nose into the Libyan tent to any noteworthy degree; a promise of a certain amount of hospital construction by the Soviets has been the chief result.

There are some who feel that the United Arab Republic may have an undue interest and exert undue influence in the province of Cyrenaica which it adjoins, and that this might spell danger to the Libyan union in the long run. Under the sage rule of King Idris, however, and his judicious, civic-minded Prime Minister Abd Majid Ka'bar, there seems little likelihood of Libya's succumbing to foreign designs. Although barred at first by a Soviet veto, Libya is a member of the United Nations, and its relations with all countries, including present-day Italy, are good. As a loyal member of the Arab League, Libya is as nationalistic as any of the other members. But after centuries of foreign occupation, the people of Libya value their independence above everything else. They are not likely to jeopardize their experiment in self-rule if they can help it, for over the last seven and a half years they have—somewhat to their own astonishment—virtually lifted themselves by their bootstraps into the status of a going concern.

King Idris has provided for his successor by naming a nephew, Prince El Hassan Rida, as crown prince with the right of succession in the event that he should die without an heir. As long as the present monarch lives, it may safely be assumed that Libya will continue its march to maturity. Much, of course, remains to be done, but what has already been accomplished augurs well for the future.

Guinea's vote to leave the French Union "was a bold, costly and fateful one," particularly because the decision seemed to anger de Gaulle. The severing of economic ties with France added heavy burdens: Guinea "owed a good deal of money to France; it had no currency of its own; from now its goods would have no free market in France, becoming subject to the customs duties placed on goods coming from foreign lands."

Guinea outside the French Community

By HARRY R. RUDIN

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SINCE the end of World War II France has been startling the world by the heady pace of its grant of self-government to the people of colonial Africa. Territorial assemblies had been set up in 1947 under the French Union and it was generally believed that the end of concessions had arrived when the *loi cadre* of June 23, 1956, enabled Africans on the basis of universal adult suffrage to elect their own territorial assemblies and to shoulder ministerial responsibility. The power of the white man was reduced to that amount fairly measured by his ratio to the total population. Now at last Africans had the right and the means to determine matters of direct concern to themselves while questions of defense, foreign policy, and other major issues remained the responsibility of government in France. No other metropolitan power in Europe has equalled the generosity of the French in freeing Africans.

But the *loi cadre* was not the end. The revolutionary changes that brought General

de Gaulle into power in France also brought with him a new constitution and more rights for the peoples of Africa. Given the choice to decide for or against this constitution, Africans were free to opt for participation in the French Community, in which there was to be one standard of citizenship for all people, or for a political existence completely independent of France. The great referendum took place on September 28, 1958.

Before that consultation of the general will, General de Gaulle made a tour of French territories in Africa, explaining to his hearers the advantages and disadvantages of the choices they were to make. He visited Guinea in August, 1958; there, as elsewhere, he made it perfectly clear to people that they were wholly free to choose continued association with France in the Community or complete independence. It was his apparent conviction that the advantages of association with France were so great as to make separation from the *métropole* unthinkable.

But the political leader in Guinea, Sekou Touré, had other and definite convictions on this issue. It is said that he told de Gaulle that the people of Guinea preferred "freedom in poverty to riches in servitude." It is also reported that de Gaulle was so annoyed with the remark that he cancelled a dinner engagement with Sekou Touré.

On the day of the referendum 85 per cent of the people eligible to vote in Guinea indicated their choice; 95 per cent of the votes

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were *non*, against the constitution and the Community. A few days later, on October 2, the territorial assembly proclaimed the formal independence of the republic of Guinea and reconstituted itself as the body empowered to make a constitution for the new state. It accepted Sekou Touré's resignation from his posts in the old government and made him head of the new. Thus ended for Guinea a long association with France, one that goes back to 1882 if one is concerned only with the beginnings of official and legal connections with France, or back to the fourteenth century if one accepts undocumented accounts about visits of Dieppe merchants to Africa at that early date.

The vote to sever established ties with France was a bold, costly and fateful one. It appears that de Gaulle was angered by the step, for he took immediate measures to place a ban on French aid to Guinea, to recall Frenchmen holding administrative posts, and to arrange for the early return of French military units that had constituted the territory's defense. The loss of French financial aid was no small matter, for France had been most generous in underwriting colonial development plans after the war. Between 1948 and 1958 France had contributed, from public and private funds, the sum of \$78.7 million to Guinea, which had helped to make the territory the second richest of the eight territories comprising the federation of French West Africa.

Other economic problems faced the new state. It owed a good deal of money to France; it had no currency of its own; from now on its goods would have no free market in France, becoming subject to the customs duties placed on goods coming from foreign lands. Since France had been taking about 70 to 80 per cent of Guinea's exports, the loss of the French market was serious. It was as though de Gaulle were making sure that Sekou Touré and his supporters would have that poverty they preferred with freedom instead of the riches that went with servitude. Actually, Sekou Touré does not seem to have believed there would be a complete economic break with France. On several occasions he has expressed a desire to "normalize" relations with France, and he has even requested French aid since the break with France was made.

Sekou Touré

In a world that assumes that all men have their price, it is important and interesting to look into this African leader who made his country independent. Sekou Touré is a young man, born in a small village in Guinea in 1922. He is virtually self-educated, having had the benefit of only a primary school education. It is said that he claims to be the grandson of the great Samory, the Muslim leader whose military prowess hampered the French conquest of Niger territories during the last two decades of the nineteenth century. At the end Samory was captured and exiled, to die far from the people for whom he had fought against French efforts to establish control.

Sekou Touré's first job was in the postal service. At the age of 22 he was deep in labor politics and soon established connections with the Communist-controlled *Confédération Générale du Travail*, which arranged to get him a period of indoctrination in Marxism in Prague. He is now a convinced Socialist and determined to make Guinea a socialist state. He denies, however, the charge of being a Communist. He has been a tireless organizer in Guinea, and worked with the political party that dominated most of the French West African territories, the *Rassemblement Démocratique Africain*. This party was founded at Bamako in 1946. For a time Sekou Touré was its vice-president while Houphouët-Boigny of the Ivory Coast was president. With the passage of time Houphouët-Boigny abandoned his extremist political and economic views and his original intention to work for the independence of Africans from colonial control.

Sekou Touré got control of the Guinea branch of the R.D.A., which was said to be more radical than other branches. It is said that he adopted the extremist views of the Left-wing of the local party. As a politician he has had a record of real achievement. He has been mayor of Conakry, the capital of Guinea. In 1952, he formed UGTAN, *L'Union Générale des Travailleurs de l'Afrique Noire*, a labor organization of 700,000 members with a record of never having lost a single strike. As a political leader Sekou Touré was a reformer, a persuasive orator in

French as well as in his native tongue. He advocated improved education, more dispensaries, a greater role for African women in affairs, a redistribution of land. He opposed tribalism and the chieftancy, supporters of conservatism and obstacles to progress and reform. A fair amount of violence and rioting attended all this political agitation and resulted in several jail terms for Sekou Touré as a consequence.

But he was popular and successful. In the elections of March 31, 1957, the first elections with universal adult suffrage under the *loi cadre*, Sekou Touré's party won 56 of the 60 seats in the territorial assembly, a victory so overwhelming that his political opponents were in no position to block his program. He was in this position of power when the referendum was held in September, 1958. There can be no question that the break with France is wholly the work of this uncommonly able, intelligent, industrious, Marxist African, the extent of whose ambitions is still unknown.

With separation from France Guinea is learning the great lesson of the twentieth century, namely, that while it is possible to achieve political independence, complete economic independence is an impossibility. Technical and financial assistance for the production and transportation of the country's resources, markets for exported goods, aid and advice on all the difficult problems which have become the concern of independent states—this is aid that only the outsider can supply. Paradoxically and inescapably, independence is impossible apart from dependence upon foreigners whose dictation one fears.

If France had hoped that Guinea would be persuaded by its many difficulties to return to the fold of the French Community, that hope died before it could be uttered. On November 23, 1958, the premiers of Guinea and of Ghana, Sekou Touré and Kwame Nkrumah, signed an agreement "to constitute our two States as the nucleus of a Union of West African States." They hoped other independent states in Africa would approve this action; they invited "the adherence to this Union of other West African States." The Union will have its own flag and will seek to harmonize the policies of both countries in regard to defense, foreign policy and

economic matters. It was stipulated that the Union was not "to prejudice the present or future relations between Ghana and the Commonwealth on the one hand and the Republic of Guinea and the French Community on the other." To his needy associate Nkrumah promised a grant of \$28 million.

A Strange Alliance

It is a strange union, this one between two states separated by hundreds of miles of territory occupied by Sierra Leone, Liberia and the Ivory Coast and by insurmountable differences of culture, language and history. Guinea has a population of 2.5 million while Ghana has 4 million. Unable to understand why Guinea wanted to break with France, some Frenchmen found in this union evidence of British machinations aiming at the control of Guinea. As a matter of fact, British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan learned of the proposed union only some 24 hours before its formal consummation in published agreement.

On December 12, 1958, the Republic of Guinea was unanimously elected the eighty-second member of the United Nations and the tenth African state in the world organization. The resolution was sponsored not by France, but by Iraq and Japan. Actually, France abstained when voting occurred in both the Security Council and in the General Assembly.

In statements made by Sekou Touré and others are intimations of an opinion that France seeks to keep Guinea more or less isolated. Perhaps the leaders in Guinea find this an adequate explanation of the tardy moves of Great Britain and the United States to establish diplomatic relations with the new state. Although the United States recognized Guinea in November, 1958, no official American representative appeared in Guinea until February, 1959; and then it was only a *chargé d'affaires* instead of a representative with full powers. Closer relations with the United States had been sought. Sekou Touré says that he wrote to President Eisenhower last November requesting American rifles for Guinea's 2000-man army. He said there was never a reply to that letter; the State Department says it never received such a letter.

Quite in contrast to the Western attitude toward Guinea is that of the Communist states of eastern Europe. On October 5 the Soviet Union recognized Guinea and made an offer of economic aid. East Germany, Bulgaria, Poland and Czechoslovakia were quick to establish diplomatic relations and other satellite states are to follow. Trade missions from East Germany and Bulgaria have visited the country; barter arrangements have been made with Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Poland and the Soviet Union. In March, 1959, a visiting Czech mission of 18 persons arrived for an official visit; it was headed by a Czech general. In recent weeks Polish ships have brought two cargoes of arms to the country, a gift from Czechoslovakia, to whom no request for arms had been sent.

This attentiveness of the Communists to Guinea's needs is coupled with the Marxist convictions of Sekou Touré to indicate that the new state sides with the East in the cold war and furnishes the Communists an excellent bridgehead for extended operations in West Africa, no faith being put in the declarations of Sekou Touré that Guinea is neutralist and definitely opposed to the acceptance of any aid with conditions attached to it.

Economic Needs

The new state has faced serious economic problems ever since the break was made with France. The country is rich in resources, agricultural and mineral. Until recent years its exports were the standard agricultural products of a tropical country—peanuts, coffee, bananas, sesame, cocoa, rubber, gum copal, citrus fruits, palm oil and so forth.

In recent years the export of minerals has increased. In 1957 exported iron was valued at \$3 million, diamonds at \$1 million, and bauxite at \$2 million. Not far from Conakry are found the virtually unexploited rich reserves of high-grade iron ore, only recently being developed. As for bauxite, used in the manufacture of aluminum, Guinea is said to possess the richest reserves in the world. Its exploitation has attracted the attention of an international consortium, whose capital comes from American, British, French, Swiss and Canadian participants. The American firm of Olin Mathieson is said to be by far the largest single share-holder.

The vast project of the consortium calls for the construction of a railway into the interior, of a great dam on the Konkouré River for producing needed electric power, and one of the world's largest plants for the production of aluminum. The total cost has been estimated at \$355 million, with actual operations to commence during 1960. The venture was undertaken on the assurance, given while France still had great influence in Guinea, of a 25-year guarantee against any increase in export taxes. Because of the new government's commitment to a Socialist program, doubt is said to exist in the minds of the promoters as to whether the partly developed project should be completed.

At the present time one can do little more than to ask questions about the future of Guinea under Sekou Touré. What is clear is that independent Guinea has become one more area in which the West and East are concerned, with the West more hampered by material interest and doctrinaire misgivings than the East.

"... We have invented weapons of unprecedented power and at the same time have found ways of delivering these weapons quickly on target, through our conquest of space—inner and to some extent outer. The scientists of the world, responding to the requests of their sovereign governments, have found a way to destroy those governments in a matter of hours. Military victory has become an obsolete concept in a world within push button distance of nuclear destruction. The "Winner" in the next big war will be that nation which kept 25 per cent of its total population alive for 12 hours longer than did its rival. Yet, wearily, automatically, we go on with the futile race for monopoly of the capacity for atomic terror—although no such monopoly can ever again exist. . . . Military security, like military victory, is a phrase from a dead language, a language which was struck forever dumb thirteen years ago at Hiroshima."

—Elmo Roper, *A Modern Foreign Policy*, an address delivered March 24, 1959.

Because Ghana is suffering "the growing pains that every new nation must experience," this author urges us to go along with Prime Minister Kwame Nkrumah's plea: "Give us time to sort ourselves out."

Ghana: Problems and Progress

By LEONARD S. KENWORTHY

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ON MARCH 6, 1957, the spotlight of world affairs shifted to the new nation of Ghana in West Africa. More than 20 other countries had won their independence since World War II, but Ghana seemed to have a special appeal. It was not only the ninth new nation in Africa; it was the first black African country to attain its independence in this century.

Correspondents and commentators suddenly "discovered" this part of the world. They were intrigued by its assumption of the name of an empire which had been great a thousand years ago. They were impressed by its rich resources. They were struck by its colorful costumes and by its American-educated leader.

Consequently the early interpretations of Ghana were usually over-optimistic. Its prospects were emphasized; its problems deemphasized.

Two and a half years have passed since that time and the pendulum of public interpretation in the United States has swung to the other extreme. Today Ghana's problems are stressed and sometimes magnified and her progress and potentialities minimized.

It would be wiser and more charitable to

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view this new nation in terms of progress and problems and to think of Ghana as undergoing the growing pains that every new nation must experience. To understand Ghana better, it might be profitable to re-read or recall a little early American history, recognizing that we were confronted with the problem of federalism versus regionalism (a problem we have not fully solved in 175 years), that we had no strong opposition party in the early months of the Washington administration, that our government was plagued with rebellious citizens who resented and resisted the imposition of taxes and revolted in a Whiskey Rebellion, and that we passed Naturalization, Alien and Sedition Acts aimed at domestic disaffection.

In such historical perspective we might be able to identify ourselves more closely with the turmoil in Ghana and to develop more understanding of her deep-seated problems. This does not mean that we must agree with all the measures taken in Ghana since its independence. But it means that we should view its brief history as a nation in a relatively detached manner. The problems of our two nations in their early years are not identical, but there are many similarities.

Fortunately Ghana has many advantages. In the first place her population is approximately five million, an advantage for organization and administration. Her territory is also small, being about equal to the size of Oregon. Furthermore, about three-fourths of her people live within a half day's ride by bus from the capital city of Accra and no two towns are more than 400 miles apart.

Although there are deep differences in religion, Ghana does not have the problem of intense jealousies which her neighbor,

Nigeria, has. Ghana lists her population as 66 per cent followers of African religions, 30 per cent Christians, and 4 per cent Muslims. Because of her climate and history, Ghana contains few Europeans or Asians and no Europeans have been permitted to own land. This means that Ghana has been spared the problems of a country like Kenya.

In terms of transportation she has had a small harbor at Takoradi, built in 1928 and recently enlarged. And she has had a better system of roads and railroads than most new countries have had. In resources Ghana has also been blessed. First of all comes cacao which has been a big money earner since Ghana has produced a large percentage of the world's supply of this product (38 per cent in 1957). In addition to this crop, she has gold, industrial diamonds, manganese and bauxite. And timber is an additional asset.

Although the per capita annual income of \$150 seems tragically low compared with \$2000 for the United States, it is high compared to approximately \$80 for the Belgian Congo, \$60 for Uganda, and \$50 for the entire subcontinent of India and Pakistan. Furthermore there has been some education in Ghana, including Achimote College, with a practical emphasis in its curriculum. And the British left behind them the nucleus of a civil service system.

Ghana also has several outstanding leaders, including such men as Prime Minister Kwame Nkrumah, Minister of Finance K. A. Gbedemah, the expert sociologist, K. A. Busia, and the head of the civil service, Robert Gardiner—all but one of them in the present government. If the good wishes of a large part of the people of Africa and many people around the world can be considered an asset, Ghana has that, too.

Progress in Ghana

At the time of independence Nkrumah asserted:

My first objective is to abolish from Ghana poverty, ignorance, and disease. We shall measure our progress by the improvement in the health of our people; by the number of children in school, and by the quality of their education; by the availability of water and electricity in our towns and villages; and by the happiness which our people take in being able to manage

their own affairs. The welfare of our people is our chief pride, and it is by this that my government will ask to be judged.

One could debate at length the objectives contained in this statement, but they are certainly among the most important goals of any regime. How then does Ghana fare by this self-imposed yardstick? Much had been done under the rule of the British to improve health conditions in Ghana, but efforts in this field have been intensified and expanded. As a result leprosy shows signs of being eliminated as a major disease in Ghana and outstanding progress has been made against yaws and malaria. Many clinics and small hospitals have been built in addition to the ultra-modern 500 bed hospital in Kumasi, with its training college on the same grounds for 300 student nurses. In order to meet the need for doctors in rural and small town areas, medical field units have been developed and several health centers have been built.

Improvement has come, too, in providing pure water in rural areas by an active movement to increase the number of "bore holes". Doctors are still very scarce and are concentrated in the larger centers, but Ghana is assisting young men to study at home and abroad by helping them with scholarships.

No one who visits Ghana can help but be impressed with the gains in education. In recent years there has been an increase in literacy from about 10 or 15 per cent to 30 or 35 per cent. Some of this has come through an intensive campaign against adult illiteracy; some of it by doubling the number of teachers available to handle the tripling of the number of children in elementary schools.

Two institutions of higher learning started by the British have been completed or expanded—the University College of Ghana near Accra and the College of Technology at Kumasi. Whether the type of education at the University College is suitable for the present needs of Ghana is open to serious debate and whether the policy of keeping the standards so high that it is not filled at present with students is dubious, but it is a beautiful, modern complex of buildings, with some remarkable facilities and some excellent teaching.

The work of the Vernacular Literature

Bureau is especially outstanding. This bureau is entrusted with the task of providing materials for new adult literates and it is forging ahead with publications in six dialects as well as in English, a really formidable task.

Ghana has made more progress in public library work than any of the new nations this writer visited in a recent nine-months trip in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. It is justly proud of its new libraries in Accra and Kumasi as well as those in smaller centers. And it has made a start on bookmobiles—an innovation not duplicated in other new nations.

Considerable enthusiasm has been engendered for a new type of practical education through the Builders' Brigades. In them youths with a limited education learn useful skills while working on the construction of roads, schools and water systems. The nearest approach to this type of education in the United States was the Civilian Conservation Corps of New Deal days.

Some steps have also been taken to improve housing conditions in the larger towns, although so far this has been limited largely to homes for middle class or upper middle class persons. Encouragement to home builders has been launched through the establishment of the Ghana Building Society, comparable to a Home Owners Loan Society in the United States.

A great deal needs to be done in Ghana to improve the status of agriculture, but in one respect Ghana has done a superb job. There has been a nation-wide campaign to stop the inroads of the disastrous swollen-shoot disease which threatened for a time to wipe out this profitable farm product. Every agency of society was used to educate the farmers on the steps that had to be taken, with tribal chiefs and government officials, school teachers and radio announcers, as well as many others, combining their efforts. This campaign has not been entirely successful and the work is not completed, but already it has showed what can be done when every agency of society combines to promote a needed national reform.

Improvements have also been made in the transportation and communication facilities of Ghana. Hundreds of miles of roads have been built or improved and scores of bridges

constructed, including a giant span over the Volta River at Adomi. But most impressive is the new port at Tema, 16 to 18 miles from Accra, which is being built to supplement the harbor at Takoradi, to provide facilities nearer to the capital, and to feed into the ambitious plans for the Volta River project. Ghana now has its own Ghana Airways and in conjunction with Israel has established the Black Star Line for sea transport.

Every new nation is determined to set up new factories because heretofore each one had to rely largely on products made in the "mother" country and shipped to the colony at a greatly increased cost to the consumers. So Ghana, like other countries, is building new industries, such as a biscuit factory at Kumasi and a match factory at Kade, with aid from the Industrial Development Corporation. In these and other ways the new government has built on the work of the British before they left Ghana officially and the results have gone far in helping Nkrumah to keep his promise to move toward the goals quoted earlier in this article.

The Volta River Project

The most ambitious plan for Ghana, however, is the Volta River project. Long a dream or a plan on paper, it now looks as if it would be realized. In April, 1959, the Kaiser Industries Corporation presented a plan to the government of Ghana whereby the estimated costs would be whittled down from \$900 million to \$600 million and the time involved in the construction of this multi-purpose project would be reduced from eight to five years.

Eventually this project would serve several purposes. It would dam the Volta River and provide power for a smelting plant, for other new industries, and for homes over a large part of Ghana. The smelting plant would transform the bauxite of Ghana into aluminum, providing her with income equivalent to that now derived from cacao. The lake formed by the 230 foot dam 60 miles northeast of Accra would also stimulate a new fishing industry and augment the protein-shy diet of Ghana. Eventually the water might also be used to irrigate some of the rich soil nearby, thus adding to the croplands of the nation.

Ghana should be able to provide some of

the funds for this giant development scheme. The rest will have to come from sources such as private firms abroad, from foreign aid sources, from private investors, and from government and U.N. loan funds.

Aside from its economic importance, this project has tremendous psychological and political implications. Psychologically the new nations consider the building of such a giant project a sign of their coming of age and being able to vie with the more industrialized nations. Politically Nkrumah and his party have made much of this project and have been disappointed if not embarrassed by the fact that it has not materialized. Undoubtedly they have been aware of the history of Nasser and the Aswan dam and have realized that there are great hazards to a new government in such an ambitious undertaking.

In this discussion of progress and problems, the Volta River project has been placed intentionally between the sections on progress and problems. Within a few months it may be moved into the progress column; today it is in suspension between the two.

Problems in Ghana

Despite this formidable list of accomplishments, Ghana is faced with a long list of problems. One of the most basic of these is the need for drastic changes in agriculture. At present Ghana is largely dependent upon one crop—cacao, which is grown by 300,000 farmers on small plots of ground. The cacao trees need to be improved and planted in plantations where they can be raised scientifically. Agriculture needs to be diversified, with more attention to rice and fodder crops, coconuts, oil palms, rubber, tobacco, rice, cola nuts, cotton, sugar, sorghum and corn. Poultry farming and some truck farming need to be encouraged. Thousands of acres of valuable forests are being exhausted and timber experts predict that it will take 40 years to develop adequate timber reserves. There are also thousands of acres of land which need to be irrigated if Ghana is to produce all that she needs and can develop.

Closely allied with these problems is the need for change in land tenure and in farming methods. Such change will be difficult to bring about because of tradition and the power of tribal chiefs. Change is needed in

order to carry out plans for industrialization, for without change men will not be freed for work in the new factories Ghana needs and intends to build.

Fortunately for Ghana her economic adviser, Professor Arthur Lewis, a West Indian on leave from the University of Manchester, is just as concerned about agriculture as about industrialization, a point of view which is unfortunately not held by all economic advisers to economically underdeveloped countries.

Every new nation is looking for capital these days and Ghana is plagued with this problem, too. She vies with other countries for capital investment and she has to prove to the world that she is stable economically and politically to attract such risk capital. Inside her own country she has to combat the age-old feeling that land is the only safe investment.

Despite tremendous progress in health, housing, and education, Ghana has a long way to go in each of these fields. Among other problems she must cope with the diversity of languages and the lack of any national language except English. Eventually Ghana may have to settle for English, as India and Pakistan have done for the foreseeable future at least.

But the major current problem of the new government is that of combining political stability with freedom. On that question the record so far is not too good. The reasons for trouble are not difficult to understand; the methods for solving these troubles are difficult to discover.

One problem is that Ghana now is independent and the millenium that some people expected has not arrived. All factions could unite in the fight against the British and for independence; now they have begun to splinter into small factions. Another difficulty is that the various sections of Ghana have little in common. There is no common history, no common language, no special feeling of belonging together.

Then there is a strong economic factor that causes dissension. Farmers resent the fact that they are compelled to cut their trees to prevent the swollen-shoot disease and they also resent the fact that the marketing-board controls prices and collects rather large sums for a stabilization fund to protect

prices in case of a collapse of prices on the world market.

This resentment is coupled with a growing feeling of regionalism, especially in the Ashanti territory. In this region where most of the cacao is grown, the farmers belong to the largest and most powerful Ghanaian tribe, the Ashanti, numbering over 900,000 persons. At the head of this group is the Asantehene, whose "stool" or symbol of power is supposed to have come from heaven.

There is also a feeling of regionalism in the Northern Territories whose people are largely Muslim and who feel that not enough of the funds of the Ghana government are being used to improve conditions in their underdeveloped part of the country.

Closely allied with this spirit of regionalism is the power of the tribal chiefs. Some of them are modern in their thinking and ways of living, but for the most part they represent the *status quo* and Nkrumah and his followers are determined to undermine their power and speed their decline.

Then there is a group of middle class opposition leaders. Some of them are sincerely disturbed over the tremendous power of Nkrumah and the Convention People's Party. Others are men who are embittered over the fact that Nkrumah and the younger leaders of the independence movement broke away from their established group and gained the credit for independence. Unfortunately for Ghana the leader of the opposition, Professor K. A. Busia, is not a skilled politician with wide appeal to the masses. If he were, he could perform an important role in Ghana.

That there have been strong measures by the present government against the opposition cannot be denied. The government has deported individuals who opposed it, changed the Constitution so that it can be amended by a simple majority and without reference to the regions, abolished the Regional Assemblies, and passed a Preventive Detention Act which has given the government the right to arrest and imprison for five years without trial any person viewed by the Cabinet as dangerous to the security of the country.

The trend in Ghana in the direction of a one-party nation or of "guided democracy"

seems to be similar to a trend in other new nations like Burma, Indonesia, Pakistan and the Sudan. It raises the basic question as to how fast such countries can move towards the type of democracy in West European countries—or whether they should try to move in that direction in view of local questions. That is a question on which the most astute political scientists cannot agree.

In international affairs Ghana has already assumed a significant role. Nkrumah has so far been able to deal on friendly terms with Israel and with Egypt or the United Arab Republic, a remarkable feat. He has also given strong leadership to the movement for independence throughout the continent of Africa. And by his trips in recent months to India, Canada, the United States and England, he has kept himself in the world spotlight and strengthened his ties with these powers.

The two most important events, however, in foreign affairs have been the formation of the federation of Ghana and Guinea and the holding of the All-African People's Conference in Accra. We shall therefore devote some space to each of these major events.

The first step towards what might someday become a federation of West African states was taken in November, 1958, when Ghana and Guinea joined in a loose confederation. This move came immediately after the vote of Guinea on the de Gaulle referendum, in which that small nation was the only area to vote itself out of the French community.

In November, Sekou Touré, Prime Minister of Guinea, travelled to Accra where he and Nkrumah issued a joint statement in which they declared that their action constituted "the nucleus of a union of West African states." They promised at that time to harmonize their defense, foreign and economic affairs, and to write a constitution for the new confederation. Ghana also promised a loan of \$28.2 million to Guinea.

Up until April, 1959, there had been little action following up the original statement regarding union of these two countries. Ministers were exchanged and a part of the loan was given to Guinea, but little else was done. Then, in April, 1959, Nkrumah went to Guinea for a state visit of three weeks where he was received with a 21 gun salute,

ordinarily reserved for heads of state which in the case of Ghana still meant Queen Elizabeth II.

Just what will emerge from Nkrumah's visit is not yet clear as this article is being written. Some observers feel that the union will remain a very loose one. They point out that Sekou Touré is not a passive puppet and will not play second fiddle to Nkrumah. They further assert that Touré has been much more favorable to the U.S.S.R., pointing out that he has accepted a shipment of arms from Czechoslovakia and has channeled one-third of the exports of Guinea to eastern Europe. And they point to the different cultural and linguistic backgrounds of Guinea and Ghana, the former with its French ties and language and the latter with its British background and English language.

Federation is in the air and it is doubtful if Nkrumah will let an opportunity like this pass by without making full use of it in his drive for a West African Federation. Certainly this union of Guinea and Ghana has already had a tremendous psychological impact and has enhanced the reputation of Nkrumah and of Ghana.

Perhaps the most significant event in Ghana since independence was the convening of the All-African People's Conference in Accra in December, 1958. This was the first such conference to be held in Africa and Ghana was appropriately selected as the site for it. Meeting under a giant banner which called for "Hands Off Africa: Africa Must Be Free," 300 delegates from 28 nations and territories and scores of organizations wrestled with such common problems as colonialism, economic assistance, violent versus non-violent methods to achieve independence.

Behind the scenes, in committee sessions, and on the floor of the conference participants and observers noted many significant aspects of the conference. One was the challenge by Nkrumah and other leaders in West and East Africa to the leadership of Nasser and the United Arab Republic. Another was the note of rebuff to the Soviets and possibly to the Egyptians in Nkrumah's opening address to the delegates:

Do not let us forget that colonialism and im-

perialism may come to us yet in a different guise, not necessarily from Europe.

A third was the pressure to urge non-violent means of attaining objectives rather than violent methods.

At the close of the conference resolutions were adopted¹ calling for universal adult direct suffrage, the dissolving of the Central African Federation, the condemnation of all discriminatory laws and practices, the granting of independence to South West Africa, the rejection of the Portuguese claim that their colonies constitute a part of metropolitan Portugal, the labelling of Nato and several other organizations as new forms of colonialism, the abolition or adjustment of arbitrary frontiers drawn up by the colonial powers, the denouncement of tribalism and religious separatism as obstacles to African unity and rapid liberation, and the eventual use of economic sanctions and a labor boycott of the Union of South Africa if it persisted in its policies of racial discrimination.

France was called upon to withdraw her troops from Algeria, to recognize the principle of independence, and to enter into negotiations with the Algerian National Liberation Front. A compromise statement on the methods to be encouraged in combating colonialism, the abolition or adjustment of those who used non-violent methods and condemning the labeling of persons who resorted to violence as criminals.

Strong support was given to the formation of a commonwealth of free African states and a small secretariat was established in Accra. Nkrumah and Tom Mboya, as host and chairman of the conference respectively, were the outstanding figures, but some opposition to Nkrumah's leadership in Africa was expressed, especially by Chief Enahoro of Western Nigeria, who urged careful consideration and wide consultation before any federations were formed.

Nkrumah once quoted Burke when referring to Ghana: "We are on a conspicuous stage and the world marks our demeanor." Ghana is in such a position and the world is watching. But as we watch we might well bear in mind another quotation from Nkrumah when he pleaded with reporters in London, saying, "Give us time to sort ourselves out." Every new nation needs such time and Ghana is no exception.

¹For the texts of these resolutions see pages 41-46 of this issue.

After four years the greatest problem an independent Morocco faces is "a crisis in leadership and direction." Yet this specialist sees the split in the Istiqlal Party as "indicative of the growing maturity of the Moroccan population."

Towards Political Maturity in Morocco

By BENJAMIN RIVLIN

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MOROCCO IS now in its fourth year of independence. The record of these past few years reveals that neither the pre-independence forebodings of doom and chaos of those cynical of Moroccan nationalism nor the nationalist's own exultant expectations of the millenium after independence have come to pass. As with nearly all human endeavour, Morocco's record of achievement falls somewhere in between. It has made progress in certain areas while it has failed in others.

Achievements

On the positive side, it must first be noted that independent Morocco is functioning as a member of the world community of nations. Emerging from colonial status as a country divided into three distinct zones (French, Spanish and the International Zone of Tangiers), each with its own currency,

economic system and governmental administration, independent Morocco has unified the country. A single currency and a uniform system of administration have been established, while economic barriers among the zones, characteristic of the pre-independence period, have been eliminated. Achievement of unification constituted a very complicated and delicate operation, which makes it all the more notable.

Not only has Morocco had to contend with the usual formidable problems of transition from colonial status to independence, but it also has had the added burden of the continuing war in Algeria. The repercussions of the Algerian war for Morocco are serious and many. They include: its disquieting psychological effect upon both the Muslim and the French inhabitants of Morocco; the difficulties in normalizing relations with France, so essential at least during this transitional period; and the straining of relations with friends of France, particularly the United States. The consequences of the absence of normal relations with France involve a breakdown in French economic and technical assistance, which were counted upon heavily.

Despite these great difficulties, Morocco has not collapsed economically. People are not starving, at least not any more so than before, but neither has the world of plenty been attained. Economic activity has slackened off from the peak periods of the protectorate days as a result of the gradual withdrawal of French capital. At the same time, the country is struggling to raise its production, cut its adverse balance of imports over

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exports, control the rising cost of living, and adjust to the two devaluations of the French franc to which its currency is pegged.

Nevertheless, Morocco is not in a state of economic chaos. The Moroccan government is engaged in a variety of activities aimed at improving economic conditions. Among these are included: "Operation Plow"—a modest program of grouping small inefficient farmers into larger units for cooperative cultivation with modern techniques and equipment; "Operation Tree," a reforestation program; an oil agreement with the Italian state-owned Hydrocarbons Agency, E.N.I., for oil exploration in a 30,000 square kilometer area in southern Morocco; and the development of a Code of Investments, designed to encourage private domestic and foreign investments by granting investors certain fiscal and tax privileges. The government of Morocco has also recognized the need for planning and governmental control over important sectors of the economy if economic progress is to be achieved. Under the leadership of Abderrahim Bouabid, Minister of National Economy, a top planning group, the *Conseil Supérieur du Plan*, has been at work on an intermediary and a long range program of development, in which the government assigns priorities to various sectors of the economy.

A process of political and administrative reorganization aimed at introducing modern democratic institutions in Morocco has been going on slowly since independence. When the French were forced out of Morocco, absolute power reverted to the sovereign monarch, King Mohammed V. Under the protectorate his sovereignty had been nominal, now it became real. All governmental power—executive, legislative and judicial—was legally his. However, from the very outset Mohammed V announced that it was his intention to transform Morocco into a constitutional monarchy. The first step in this direction was taken in November, 1956, when the King created the National Consultative Assembly, consisting of 74 appointed members. The role of the Consultative Assembly was defined as: 1) strengthening contact between the sovereign and his people; and 2) control of the executive by written questions and interpellations addressed to various ministers. The members of the As-

sembly were appointed as representatives of political parties, economic organizations, professions, cultural organizations, youth groups, religious groups and independents. While not having any formal power, the Consultative Assembly has developed as a significant forum in which governmental policy, particularly the budget and economic policy, is debated.

The most important development in this process of introducing new political institutions in Morocco was the issuance of the Royal Charter by King Mohammed V on May 8, 1958. In this charter, the king declared:

We are determined to establish a constitutional monarchy which will take into account the higher interests of the country and its distinctive features, thereby achieving a true democracy that will draw upon the spirit of Islamic teachings, the evolution of our country, and the progressive participation of our people in the conduct of our country's affairs.

The Royal Charter was not a constitution, but a statement of intentions. It indicated the direction political and administrative reform was to take in Morocco in order to achieve the goal of a "constitutional monarchy." Specifically, it provided for: 1) the replacement of the National Consultative Assembly by a National Deliberative Assembly, which would share some of the King's power; 2) the eventual separation of powers between the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government and the establishment of an independent judiciary; 3) the vesting of executive power in the cabinet, whose ministers would be individually and collectively responsible to the King; 4) the guarantee of freedom of opinion, expression, assembly and association; 5) the substitution of *communes* for the tribal system as the basic administrative units and units of representation; 6) the election of municipal and communal councils, who in turn would elect representatives to the National Deliberative Assembly; 7) the eventual election of a National Assembly through universal suffrage.

The first step toward the implementation of the Royal Charter was to be the holding of municipal and communal elections, which Moroccan authorities hoped would take place fairly soon after the issuance of the charter. However, they soon realized that

preparation for the elections would take considerable time in view of the "new experience" that the elections represented both for the people and the government. As the King pointed out in his speech from the throne on November 18, 1958:

When we started the preparation of those elections, we faced a complete vacuum: no electoral law, no voters lists, no definite districts. We had to make up for those failures by elaborating an electoral law, by proceeding to a nationwide census for the establishment of the regular lists of voters and the delimitation of the districts.

Anxious that these first elections prove successful, the King and the Moroccan government have taken painstaking steps in their preparations. In the same speech from the throne, the King announced the promulgation of the Code of Public Liberties which would permit "the elections to be the true expression of the voters' will." A special technical committee, headed by a non-political Under-Secretary of the Interior to Prepare the Elections, was created. A study group headed by Professors Maurice Duverger and Henri Laubadère, two prominent French authorities on elections and Morocco's administrative organization, was consulted on the creation of the *communes* and the establishment of the election procedure. The task of establishing *communes* proved particularly difficult in certain regions where traditional tribal groups balked at their incorporation within the *commune* system. Finally, last April the preparations were completed with the division of Morocco into 800 *communes*—electoral districts of 10,000 inhabitants each in which both men and women will be given the franchise.

Education

Rounding out Morocco's record of achievement since independence is the new emphasis being placed on education. Aware that one of Morocco's great failings is its inadequately trained population, the Moroccan government has begun to overhaul the educational system. In view of the great need for trained personnel, currently being met with the use of French technicians and teachers, priority is being given to technical and professional training. In this way, Morocco hopes to achieve the "Moroccanization" of the administration and education

system. Toward this end, the University of Rabat has been created, giving Morocco its first modern liberal institution of higher learning, in contrast to the 1,000 year-old, traditionally Islamic Kairouyine University at Fez.

Morocco has also intensified its efforts to bring education to the masses. Since independence, Morocco has conducted an annual anti-illiteracy campaign among adults during the month of Ramadan. Working with very limited means, the Moroccan government has increased the numbers of students attending primary and secondary schools. However, the problem of education is not merely one of numbers. Morocco has two educational systems existing side-by-side—one, the traditional Arabic-Islamic, and the other, the modern European. Morocco's goal, in the words of Minister of National Education Benjelloun is "to take all that is desirable from the undeniably beautiful French civilization and to introduce it into our educational system, thus adding to our traditional Muslim civilization everything enriching that it can absorb."

Summing up the record of Morocco's accomplishments since independence—in the political, economic and educational spheres,—it would appear to be more a series of declarations of intentions rather than a record of positive achievement. This points up the negative side of Morocco's three and a half years of independence. Despite all the talk of the future, plans for political reform, educational improvement, economic development and so forth, Morocco seems to be drifting. There has been much talk of future developments but few tangible results. Independence has meant very little for the average Moroccan from a material viewpoint. That Morocco has not experienced a serious economic crisis is due in no small part to the built-in momentum developed under the protectorate. This cannot continue very much longer, and Morocco is in danger of a very serious economic situation. She seems to be going through all the motions called for under these circumstances—a *Conseil Supérieur du Plan*, development schemes, and so forth. Nevertheless, the future is uneasy because of a more fundamental difficulty—a crisis in leadership and direction.

From the very outset of independence,

Morocco has been confronted with a serious leadership problem. The present strife in the Istiqlal Party is merely the fruition of this long-standing difficulty. It was to be expected that in independent Morocco, those who would emerge as leaders of the new régime would be those most closely identified with the nationalist victory over the French. A number of diverse elements fall within this category—the King, the Istiqlal Party, the Army of Liberation, and the labor unions.

Problem of Leadership

Heading the list is the King, Mohammed V. Because he resisted French efforts to undermine the sovereignty of Morocco for which he was dethroned and forced into exile in 1953, he has become the personification of Morocco's struggle for independence. Added to this is his traditional position as Chief Imam of his people, i.e., leader of the faithful. These combined virtues place Mohammed V above all others in personal popularity in Morocco. The prestige of his office and his personal popularity place Mohammed V in a singularly powerful position to exert spiritual and moral leadership. As for actual political leadership, he has had to share his power with the nationalist leaders, while remaining the locus of all legal authority as absolute monarch. The need to share power with the nationalists, particularly the Istiqlal Party, arose because: 1) the Istiqlal Party was in a position to demand and exercise power having emerged as the most solidly organized group in the country after playing an equally important role in Morocco's fight for independence; 2) it was in keeping with his intention to transform Morocco into a constitutional monarchy.

Mohammed V has certainly not abdicated his power prerogatives, for little has been done by the Moroccan government since independence without his authority. But he has not been in the position to exert the dynamic and day to day leadership of an active political leader. Often giving the impression of being in the anomalous position of the monarch who has to rule but who would prefer to reign, his self-image seems to be that of a national father, the arbiter of political disputes, the protector of the peoples' interests, and as he described himself in the Royal Charter—the embodiment of national sov-

ereignty and its faithful and vigilant guardian. This attitude of Mohammed V, while removing him somewhat from the actual direction of affairs, has served a very useful function. It has preserved the King as the symbol of national unity and stability.

More direct involvement of the King in politics would subject him to criticism which would be misunderstood in a country like Morocco with a population that is politically unsophisticated and inexperienced. The consequences of such criticism of the King could be very serious. Thus, the King's attitude has had a stabilizing effect during the turbulent first years of independence. Yet this stabilizing effect has not been strong enough to steer Morocco on a direct course forward. This should have been the function of the political leaders, particularly of the Istiqlal Party, had they been prepared to discharge it. However, a combination of inexperience in running a government and the nature of the Istiqlal Party stood in the way.

The leaders of the nationalist movement who suddenly found themselves with a responsibility to help direct a government, formulate positive policy programs, and mobilize public opinion in a different kind of struggle, were inexperienced revolutionaries and conspirators but not governmental administrators and planners. Their experience had been to destroy, to stir up peoples' hatred and emotions, to mobilize a revolutionary force. It was not easy for them to make the adjustment from revolutionary-conspirators to responsible administrators. Some could not make the adjustment at all, while others, anxious to discharge their new responsibilities efficaciously, were hampered by their lack of experience. Few, if any, of the nationalist leaders had a chance to gain any administrative experience under the protectorate régime. The effect of this situation was to weaken the leadership and direction this group would offer to the country.

Istiqlal Party

Contributing perhaps even more to the foundering leadership given by the Istiqlal Party to the country is the composition of the party itself. The Istiqlal Party has been more a national movement than an ideologically or socially monolithic party. It has included within itself various social elements

and ideological tendencies: extreme and moderate nationalists; religious traditionalists; business and labor leaders; *bourgeoisie* and workers; urban and rural groups and intellectuals and non-intellectuals. During the course of the patriotic struggle against French rule it was relatively easy to bring all these groups together behind the nationalist banner of the Istiqlal Party. But once independence was achieved, the bonds holding these diverse elements began to loosen. There was no one leader within the party able to hold the coalition of factions together. Inevitably, this led to the current split.

The split was evident at the very outset of independence when, for the first time, all elements of the party were brought together. These included the older generation of party founders such as Allal el-Fassi and Ahmed Balafrej, who had been in exile, and the younger leaders like Bouabid, Mehdi Ben Barka, Mahjub Ben Seddik and Mohammed Al-Basri, who had organized the resistance at home. At the two congresses of the Istiqlal Party in December, 1955, and August, 1956, it was plainly evident that the party would have great difficulty in housing all its adherents under one roof. That an open schism did not take place immediately was due to the fact that the leaders of the various tendencies within the party found it necessary to form a solid front against their political rivals, who were included in Morocco's first independent government. The Istiqlal Party attributed the inclusion of the very much smaller *Parti Démocratique de l'Indépendance* (P.D.I.) and independent nationalists to French pressure. Headed by an independent and close friend of the King, Embarek Bekkai, the first government had in it eight Istiqlal ministers, five P.D.I.'s, and five independents.

At the August, 1956, Congress of the Istiqlal Party, Allal el-Fassi and Mehdi Ben Barka, who today are leading the rival factions of the Istiqlal Party, worked together in formulating the party catch-all platform, which called for the elimination of the P.D.I. from the government and the assumption of full control by the Istiqlal Party. At first, the King resisted Istiqlal pressures to change the government, but in October, 1956, following the French decoying of the Moroccan plane carrying the five Algerian rebel lead-

ers to conference with King Mohammed and Premier Bourguiba of Tunisia, the King yielded to Istiqlal demands and dropped the P.D.I. ministers. However, he retained Bekkai as Prime Minister as well as six independent non-party ministers, giving the Istiqlal Party eight out of the fifteen ministers. During the ensuing 18 months of the second Bekkai government, while the Istiqlal Party was still demanding the formation of a one-party government, the rivalries within the party were slowly building up. The party still had enough coherence and discipline to bring about the downfall of the Bekkai government in April 15, 1958, when all the Istiqlal ministers resigned *en masse* from the government.

The Istiqlal Party had long been contending that the coalition nature of the Bekkai government stood in the way of the development of a vigorous government policy. Leading the fight within the Istiqlal Party were the younger and more progressive elements headed by Minister of National Economy Bouabid, Mehdi Ben Barka, President of the Consultative Assembly, Mahjub Ben Seddik, President of the U.M.T., Morocco's labor movement, and Abdullah Ibrahim, Minister of Labor. In a very large measure the attack on the Bekkai government was an attack upon the conservative members of the Istiqlal Party and indirectly a veiled attack upon the King's power. The progressives found the policies of the Bekkai government too temporizing. They wished to replace it with a more militant and activist policy. For nearly one month, Morocco was without a government. Finally, on May 8, simultaneously with the issuance of the Royal Charter, the King resolved this governmental crisis by naming Ahmed Balafrej, Secretary-General of the Istiqlal Party, as the head of a new all-Istiqlal government. However, the King chose a government made up of ministers largely from the moderate and conservative wings of the party. An exception was Bouabid, who retained his position as Minister of National Economy.

Intra-Party Politics

The next few months saw the split in the Istiqlal Party coming out into the open. The progressive wing was unhappy with the conservative Balafrej government. Increasingly,

the government, although all-Istiqlal in composition, was criticized in the party organ *Al-Istiqlal*, which was in the hands of Mehdi Ben Barka. In August, Ben Barka was forced to resign as editor of the weekly. The lines of battle were being drawn. The government came in for heavy criticism on the part of the U.M.T. In September, an attempt was made to heal the growing breach. Progressive leaders joined with members of the Istiqlal Executive Committee in the creation of a four-man special committee, in which both factions were represented, with the task of reaching an agreement on the conditions for holding a new congress of the party on January 11, 1959. The congress was never held because the two factions could not agree.

Among the key issues dividing the factions was the composition of the Congress. Heretofore, participating in the party congress were 100 "notables," who were not representative of local sections of the party and who belonged to the conservative wing of the party. The progressives seeking to dominate the party congress wanted to eliminate these "notables" but the conservatives would not yield. In the meantime, the attacks on the Balafrej government continued. The outbreak of disorders among certain tribes in the Rif and Middle Atlas mountains contributed to the charge that the Balafrej government was weak and unable to cope with the security of the nation. In November, the progressives brought about the downfall of the Balafrej government when Minister of National Economy Bouabid, the only non-conservative member of the government, resigned.

Government Crisis Unresolved

The ensuing governmental crisis proved even more difficult for the King to resolve than the earlier one of May. After failing in several attempts to have either a non-party figure or a conservative leader assume the premiership, on December 16 the King turned to Abdullah Ibrahim, a leader of the progressive wing of the party, and invested him as premier. However, the King invested Ibrahim, not as a party member, but "in his personal capacity" and called the government one of "limited duration" which will have as its prime task the organization of the

municipal and rural elections. The Ibrahim government, while including several prominent independent ministers particularly in the ministries of Defense and Justice, was made up predominantly of members of the progressive wing of the Istiqlal Party.

The open split finally came on January 25 last when Mehdi Ben Barka at an extraordinary meeting of 12 regional sections of the Istiqlal Party in Casablanca announced the restructuring of the party as "a party of the masses." Joining with Ben Barka were Mahjub Ben Seddik and Mohammed Basri, leaders of the U.M.T. and Thami Ammar, the Minister of Agriculture in the Ibrahim government, but not Bouabid nor the Prime Minister. The following day Allal el-Fassi, titular "leader" of the Istiqlal Party since its creation, assumed control of the Istiqlal Party and read Ben Barka and company out of the party. In the next few days, both sides claimed to have complete control over the party organization, but it was difficult to determine the real state of affairs.

After a few weeks, it became clear that neither side had won a conclusive victory. The party cadre generally remained loyal to Allal el-Fassi, who thereby kept control of the party newspapers—*Al-Istiqlal* and *Al-Alam*. On the other hand, Ben Barka had the support of the powerful U.M.T., which while denying that it was controlled by any political faction put its newspaper *L'Avant-Garde* at Ben Barka's disposal. In an attempt to cut into the labor union support of the "mouvement du 25 Janvier," as Ben Barka's group had become known, Allal el-Fassi has organized "free unions" and has had some limited success in splitting the Moroccan labor movement. Within the past few months, the "orthodox" Istiqlal Party of Allal el-Fassi aided by the "free unions" and Ben Barka's "mouvement du 25 Janvier" aided by the U.M.T. have been involved in an acrimonious battle of words which at times has erupted into violence.

Assassination of Ben Driss

On April 24, Abdelaziz Ben Driss, a trusted friend of Allal el-Fassi and member of the Istiqlal Party's *Conseil Supérieur*, was assassinated in a mountain village south of Marrakech while on party business. Charg-

ing the government with responsibility for the assassination because of its failure to control disorder, Allal el-Fassi ousted Premier Abdullah Ibrahim from the Istiqlal Party. The ousting of Ibrahim merely confirmed what in reality already existed. Although the government had officially been maintaining neutrality in the intra-party struggle, the sympathies of Ibrahim and of the Istiqlal members of his government were known to be with Ben Barka. On the very day of the assassination of Ben Driss, the U.M.T. opened its second Congress in Casablanca, with Prime Minister Ibrahim, Vice Premier and Minister of National Economy Bouabid, and several other ministers in attendance, while outside several hundred militants of Allal el-Fassi's free unions rioted.

The split in the Istiqlal Party is understandable in terms of the changes that have taken place within it. From its original character as an exclusive political club drawing its members from the upper *bourgeoisie* and the intelligentsia, during the past six years it took on an omnibus nature, with a

strong working class element at its base. The split is indicative of the growing political maturity of the Moroccan population—for issues are becoming important. In a real sense the party split will make the forthcoming elections more meaningful for it will give the people clearer alternatives. While many of the issues are being clouded by the exchange of invective among the leading personalities, the clash reflects a basic doctrinal division between the conservatives and the progressives. This may be an oversimplification of the nature of the schism, yet it can be described as having taken place between those to whom independence was an end in itself, the conservatives, and the progressives, to whom independence is a means to an end, social change and reform. It remains to be seen whether the split within the Istiqlal will lead to further political maturity and responsibility in Moroccan life or whether it will create so deep a cleavage within Moroccan society that it will be difficult for a democratic constitutional monarchy to develop.

"Africa's socio-economic problems, in sum, constitute a major challenge to the West. No one nation can possibly solve them alone. Africa must have and deserves the cooperative support of her free world partners in this endeavor. Happily much has already been done, and more is being organized. . . ."

"As the old Africa refashions its visage and the new, vibrant, and politically articulate Africa evolves, the United States recognizes the challenge of the hour—the challenge to contribute to the stability and orderly evolution of this giant continent; to be responsive to its needs and sympathetic to its legitimate aspirations."

"It is evident that new Africa is generally opposed to racial discrimination and rule from without; that it is earnestly seeking greater unity of purpose; that it shows considerable favor to the creation of regional associations to meet the need for coordinated social, economic and political development; that the United Nations Trusteeship System and other United Nations activities are materially assisting the orderly advancement of the continent; that Africans need important outside assistance to meet their pressing economic problems; and that international communism is actively working to subvert African nationalism to its purpose. The West must show dedication and imagination and build a new relationship with the dynamic 20th century Africa based on principles of equality, justice and mutual understanding."

"In a spirit of partnership, of enlightened good will and generosity worthy of its position as a major world power, the United States must assist Africa to achieve its objectives by peaceful and orderly means. . . ."

—Joseph C. Satterthwaite, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, *The United States and the New Africa*, an address delivered on January 17, 1959.

Tunisia is caught in the conflict between the forces agitating for Arab and African independence and the West's determination to maintain stability. As this contributor sees it, Tunisia is dependent on Western aid for its "rapid development and [if] extremist nationalism is to be averted . . . ; but as long as the Algerian War continues, the Tunisians must continue to oppose French policy and the French will persist in permitting only a trickle of Western aid to flow to Tunisia."

Tunisia and Arab Nationalism

By GEORGE W. SHEPHERD

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TUNISIA, under the dynamic leadership of President Habib Bourguiba, is the most hopeful of all North African states. Yet the sands of President Bourguiba's hourglass may be soon running out. Although he is still immensely popular with his people, Bourguiba is caught in the vortex of shifting desert storms whipped up by the rivalry of power blocs. It will take supreme statesmanship to avoid the loss of modern Tunisia beneath the sands of Africa that have buried in times past the monuments and hopes of Phoenicians, Greeks, Carthaginians, Arabs, Turks and finally, Frenchmen. All Tunisian leaders recognize that their greatest hope lies in the creation of a united Maghreb of Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco, possibly including Libya. But can this be accomplished in time?

In terms of assets, Bourguiba has at present the vast prestige of a successful revolutionary leader. In addition, he has (unlike many revolutionaries) shown unusual administra-

tive ability and flashes of statesmanship. It was Bourguiba who planned and led the long struggle of the Neo-Destour against the French for the independence of his country. Although educated as a barrister in Paris and married to a French woman, he decided very early in life that French assimilation must be rejected and Tunisian identity must be found within an independent Arab North Africa. He broke with more moderate Tunisian nationalists in the 1930's and led a group of young lower middle-class intellectuals in the formation of the Neo-Destour.¹ Like Nehru of India, he spent nearly half his early political life in prison and exile; but his characteristic determination never let him waver from his goal. His influence has been so vast in North Africa that a cult of Bourguibism has emerged.

Bourguibism is distinguished from other recent forms of nationalism in Africa by its openly pro-Western orientation. Bourguiba has been well described as a Fabian, one who is willing to bide his time and strike at the right historical moment and is ready to adapt himself to new tactics.

To treat with today's enemies, never forget that they must be tomorrow's friends; if negotiations are broken off, resume them indefatigably, using force only as a last resort . . . create a nation but transcend nationalism by considering the struggle for freedom in terms of ethics and ideals; never compromise on the principle of independ-

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¹ For a detailed description of the rise of the Neo-Destour, see "The Tunisian Nationalist Movement," Benjamin Rivlin, *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 6, No. 2, Spring 1952.

ence; but realize that progress must be gradual, and come to terms on necessary concessions.²

Following this philosophy of gradualism, Bourguiba has been attempting to work with the West, while supporting Algerian independence and maintaining Tunisian identity as an Arab state at the head of the Maghrebi coalition. However, his compromising pro-Western political philosophy has brought severe criticism from Arab nationalists at home and abroad. F.L.N. (the National Liberation Front) Algerian leaders have begun to distrust him and the rift with Cairo and the Arab League has deepened. Yet Tunisia's President Bourguiba has insisted that his country's foreign relations must continue to have this tripartite base. As he stated in an article appearing in *Foreign Affairs*:

Tunisian policy is determined both by its history and by its geography. Because Tunisia is a part of Africa, it tends to identify itself firmly with other North African nations, whose interests it shares. As a member of the Arab community, it has brotherly relations with the Arab countries to the East. And because it is situated in the "West," and is a neighbor to Europe, and in particular to France, it looks for security and economic progress in a close alliance with the free nations of the West. It is along these three lines that our foreign policy must develop.³

This sounds rational and appeals to Western ears. Nevertheless, many observers of the North African scene question whether or not, on this platform, the Tunisian leader can maintain his position as titular spokesman for Maghrebi nationalism.

Internal Economy

Unless nationalist leaders can begin to fulfill the rising expectations of their people by producing the goods for a higher standard of living, they soon lose their popular following. Bourguibism is not likely to be an exception to this rule. Any serious and objective view of internal economic conditions in Tunisia is alarming in the most optimistic light.

Tunisia's basic economic difficulty is a rapidly expanding population within the limitations of scarce resources and a diminishing supply of capital. Already in major centers like Tunis 25 per cent of the working population is unemployed and a considerable

additional number is under-employed. Population keeps on growing at a rate that has increased the number of Tunisians by 20 per cent in the last 10 years. Most economists agree that without substantial capital flow into Tunisia, the state cannot be viable.

The country was developed by French capital. However, along with many French settlers, French capital is fleeing Tunisia at a growing rate. In December President Bourguiba announced that all land belonging to foreigners would be bought by the Government. Further capital flight took place when Tunisia did not follow the French franc in devaluation. To some observers, the breaking down of the Franco-Tunisian customs union, combined with these other developments, indicates that Tunisia already has one foot outside the franc zone. As a financial expert recently expressed it: "Between France and Tunisia it's a divorce by mutual consent, with wrongs on both sides."⁴

The Tunisians are not oblivious to the realities of economic development. They have mapped out extensive economic development programs which are calculated to bring about a general and gradual rise in standards of life. They estimate, given the available resources and manpower, that it should be possible to raise national income by about four per cent per annum. This is not much, considering the rate of population growth, but at least this would be progress and reverse expanding mass misery.

Improved agriculture is the key to Tunisian progress. Massive irrigation schemes have been launched. The Medierda Valley Development Project, which will cost about \$75 million and will reclaim and bring under irrigation hundreds of thousands of acres in the Central and Southern regions, is one such scheme. Tunisia has extensive areas of land that could be cultivated by tapping the great lakes that are beneath her arid soil. Her primary shortage is power. Lacking oil and water power, she is dependent upon outside sources. Perhaps the new pipe-line, routed partly through Tunisia, from the Algerian Sahara fields now being developed, will provide an ultimate solution.

² This Bourguibism is outlined in Tunisia, *Sec. of State for Information, the Tunisian Government, 1956, p. 47.*

³ *Foreign Affairs, July, 1957, p. 653.*

⁴ *The Economist, February 21, 1959, p. 695.*

While Tunisian resources are scarce, government plans call for the development of industry phosphates and iron ore, along with agriculture. In order to achieve the four per cent growth rate, Tunisia will need to invest capital on the scale of \$180 million a year. Perhaps half of this can be derived from local sources, both public and private; but the other \$90 million must come from abroad.⁵ The shortage of skilled workers is very great. Plans have been made for training more engineers and attracting technical assistance personnel from the Western world. But the French who remained to staff the Government technical posts are leaving by the boatload and plans for training Tunisians are proceeding very slowly.

The Problem of Algeria

This brief sketch of the economic conditions of Tunisia serves to point up the fact that the life of the Bourguiba Government is dependent upon international agreements of the most complex and difficult sort. At the center stands the problem of the Algerian war. A unified development of the Maghreb, such as Tunisian utilization of Algerian oil, is most desirable but impossible as long as the war continues. In addition, Tunisian support for the F.L.N. has increasingly alienated the French who might otherwise supply a large portion of Tunisia's capital and technical needs. And as long as the rest of the Western world will not risk alienation of the French by moving into one of her "spheres of influence," there is little prospect of much assistance from this side of the world. Aid for Tunisia is viewed by the French as not only undermining their predominance there but also providing an indirect subsidy for the Algerian rebels who are being aided in their turn by the Tunisians.

The Tunisian Government has been assisting the F.L.N. in its war against the French. Bourguiba admitted as much publicly when he said of the Algerian war, "We are not neutral." But the scope of assistance is often exaggerated by press reports and the imagination of the French. In December of 1957, when the United States sought to deliver a few hundred rifles to the Tunisian army, the French raised strenuous opposition on the grounds that these arms would find their way

into the hands of the Algerians. Actually, Bourguiba needed these arms for his own army that numbers about 7,000 men and is much more poorly equipped than are the Algerians.

The principle assistance Tunisia gives the F.L.N. is sanctuary, which is by no means inconsiderable. The Algerian Liberation Army moves back and forth across the electrified frontier and supplies from Egypt and other sources pass through Tunisia into the rebel strongholds in the mountains. Sanctuary support infuriates the French army and it has continued to exercise what it calls "the right of hot pursuit," whereby it pursues the retreating Algerians across the border. This has set off a number of skirmishes between the French forces and the Tunisians. The most serious of these was the deliberate French bombing in February, 1958, of the Tunisian village of Sakiet Sidi Youssef, in which the lives of many Tunisian civilians were lost, the Algerians having already evacuated the town. Tempers flared and a major conflict between France and Tunisia was averted only by the intervention of the United Nations Security Council and the mediation of the United States and Great Britain. Consequently, France was forced to evacuate most of her troops from Tunisian soil and the naval base at Bizerte was turned over to Tunisia with the French continuing to utilize it.

Despite his sympathy for the rebel cause and his recognition of the Provisional Government of Algeria in exile, Bourguiba has been attempting to persuade the F.L.N. to accept a negotiated settlement with France. It is known that he believes they will gain their independence within a reasonable period of time if they accept a temporary settlement now which might be short of complete independence at first. This is the tactic he himself employed in 1955 when he requested his forces to stop fighting and signed an agreement with the French on the principle of interdependence. After the first elections were held, in which the Neo-Destour swept the board, there was no longer any question as to who was in power.

The F.L.N. leadership has firmly rejected Bourguiba's "Fabianism." The Algerians

⁵ "Tunisia," *Op. Cit.*, sets forth in elaborate detail some of these plans for economic development, especially, pp. 154-173.

argue that the French have far more at stake in Algeria than in Tunisia and that the French army cannot be trusted to keep its bargain that free elections will be held. Too much blood has been spilled on both sides, they feel, and the French will come to terms only out of exhaustion. Also, the F.L.N. is increasingly annoyed with Bourguiba, who (they feel) is failing to give them the support they need. The recent Franco-Tunisian agreement to build a pipe-line across a section of Tunisia from the oil fields in the Algerian Sahara has angered them intensely. Editorials in the July, 1958, issues of *El Moudjahid* lashed out at this agreement that "jeopardize[s] the highest principles of our struggle . . . the total liberation of Algeria including the Sahara, and the unity of the Maghreb."

The Algerians play upon the rivalry between Cairo and Tunis for all it is worth, transferring their headquarters periodically between the two points. They know as well as Bourguiba does that they have the intense emotional support of the masses of Arab peoples of North Africa. If any North African government should slacken its support for their common cause, it will open a dangerous avenue of attack for its opponents.

Here lies the essential dilemma for the Tunisian Government. If there is to be rapid development and extremist nationalism is to be averted, substantial assistance will have to be derived from the West; but as long as the Algerian War continues, the Tunisians must continue to oppose French policy and the French will persist in permitting only a trickle of Western aid to flow to Tunisia.

Tunisian-Egyptian Rivalry

This dilemma for Tunisia is compounded by the rivalry between President Nasser and President Bourguiba for leadership of North Africa. The Tunisians have long been critical of the "anti-Western" character of Cairo's "positive neutrality" policy and have advocated a pro-Western orientation for the Maghreb. Particular difficulties have arisen over the shelter given by Nasser to Salah ben Youssef, the principal political opponent of Bourguiba, who was formerly secretary-general of the Neo-Destour. Ben Youssef and his radical supporters fled the country

soon after Bourguiba took power. The Tunisian Government claims that ben Youssef organized a *coup d'état* and an attempt to assassinate Bourguiba. Ben Youssef has been condemned to death *in absentia* by a Tunisian court.

Thus ben Youssef presents a continuous threat to the Bourguiba government, which has recently uncovered considerable restlessness among the Party's Left-wing. The editor of *L'Action*, the party organ, was dismissed and the paper was temporarily suspended for its criticism of the government. In the trade unions, the Left opposition has strong support. Ahmed ben Salah, a young intellectual, has been silenced and Habib Achour, a veteran of the U.G.T.T.'s (General Union of Tunisian Workers) crucial role in the nationalist struggle, who has shown strong independence of mind, remains as a potential opponent of the regime.⁶

These difficulties and rivalries with Nasser's supporters were behind the Tunisian walk-out from the Arab League in October, 1958. Shortly thereafter, the Tunisian government arrested four Egyptian army officers who were said to be plotting with ben Youssef and certain Algerian leaders against Bourguiba. However, the recent shift in Cairo tactics toward a hard line on communism and the Soviet Union creates a new perspective for the Arab League which may bring Bourguiba and Nasser closer together.

Relations with the West

In the long run, the U.A.R. may well undermine the popularity of the Bourguiba government if its ebullient president cannot find a basis of accommodation with the West that permits him both to be the spokesman of genuine North African nationalism and the principal provider of progress.

The impasse between France and Tunisia has already been defined. It is unlikely that the French will readily accept either of these major roles for Bourguiba. But by appealing over the head of France to the United States and other Western powers, Bourguiba is hoping to be able to arouse the support he so obviously needs.

To date, the United States has responded

⁶ Peter Barther, in his article, "Bourguiba: A Different Kind of Arab," *Harper's*, Oct., 1957, deals with some aspects of these internal rivalries.

very cautiously. Fear of arousing Rightist French groups by extending economic and military aid is paramount in American policy. It has been suggested in some circles that if Tunisia would join the Nato alliance this would be a way out of the impasse. But this would be sure suicide for Bourguiba, because it would demonstrate in the eyes of the Arab world that Tunisia had become a member of "the imperialist camp" as the Egyptians have been saying all along. Moreover, Nato is increasingly regarded in North Africa as the source of much of the difficulty between European powers and the new African states.

United States Response

Many serious students of North African affairs have come to the conclusion that the United States can no longer maintain its indecisive and "fence-sitting" posture in North Africa. As Benjamin Rivlin expressed it, "The United States cannot have it both ways. If the United States is to pursue a successful policy in North Africa, it must be prepared to incur the disfavor of France."⁷ He suggests that the United States must take the risk of directly aiding the North Africans. But more than increased arms shipments, Mr. Bourguiba needs economic support. Through the Development Loan Fund and I.C.A., the United States could find a substantial proportion of the estimated \$90 million needed in Tunisia. This would not be Yankee imperialism. It would simply be shrewd Yankee horse sense—to rescue the pro-democratic

Tunisian government from the slow death by starvation that now seems to be its fate. Perhaps even more significant, this would be an active rather than a passive American policy.

Our present economic program in Tunisia entails about \$20 million in 1958–1959, plus another \$10 million in surplus agricultural commodities. But this program needs to be tripled if real economic viability and political stability are to be realized. The acute shortage of teachers and skilled industrial personnel can be met in part by American overseas personnel. In the long run, the suggestion for the establishment of a Tunisian National University with I.C.A. help is one of the many useful projects the United States ought to support in order to place Tunisia upon a firm foundation.⁸

President Bourguiba, in an interview with an American correspondent, warned Americans: "Stick with France and you will not only lose Algerians, you will also lose all of North Africa to the Communists and eventually all of the African continent as an inevitable consequence." As difficult as this choice is, the time is not far off when the United States will have to choose. The choice will of necessity be part of a wider policy that takes into account the full significance of the shift of the balance of power to the Afro-Asian bloc.

⁷ "The North African Challenge," *Current History*, March, 1958, p. 151.

⁸ See "A National University for Tunisia," by Vernon McKay, *SAIS Review*, Winter, 1959.

"It is a shocking fact that today in this Twentieth Century the livestock on a well-tended American farm are better housed and better fed than at least a billion human beings on earth and there is a vague but rising wave of resentment of man against his lot throughout the under-developed regions.

"A ferment is at work that already has produced irresistible demands for a stepped up economic and social change. It will bring further demands. Political leaders must promise economic improvement, and failure to produce visible gains will provoke unrest and bring extremists to power. Passivity, fatalism and renunciation are passing. There is radical new thinking and demands for something more and better.

"... In under-developed countries where the new expectations and demands are especially strong there is terrific pressure for tangible results quickly. Governments must attempt to achieve in a few years an economic and social transformation which we needed several centuries to work out gradually in the Western world."

—Charles Nutter, Managing Director of International House, in an address delivered January 29, 1959.

The Sudan is a country that "came to independence with no tradition of religious, cultural, linguistic or political unity," notes this writer, who believes that "it will take time, and quite possibly more pain, before the Sudan forges itself into a nation and resolves its relationships with the somewhat contradictory pulls of African and Arab unity."

The Sudan in Transition

By HELEN A. KITCHEN

Formerly Special Assistant to the Department of State's Chief of Research for the Near East, Africa and South Asia, 1952-1958.

THE SUDANESE military *coup d'état* of November 17, 1958, was neither in intent nor in fact a revolution. It changed the faces of office-holders from civilians to army generals, but it did not challenge the basic internal or external policies of the previous regime and it did not, at least directly, change a political and social fabric in which family and sectarian loyalties tend to carry more weight than party, ideological or national considerations. The *coup* was aimed primarily at warding off outsiders who might be tempted to take advantage of the growing impasse in parliamentary government resulting from mounting factional strife. It succeeded because the major political leaders who engaged in the name-calling and intrigue which preceded the events of November 17 were moderate conservatives. When confronted with the alternative of cooperating in a military truce or continuing the roller coaster ride toward an unknown

and possibly radical end, both the "ins" and the "outs" acquiesced in the plan to set parliamentary government aside in the interests of establishing order and insulating the country against a non-Sudanese solution of its coming-of-age problems.

General Ibrahim Abboud, 58, the non-political Chief of Staff of the traditionally non-political Sudanese Army, did not seek his job as Prime Minister of the Sudan. He was selected by a consensus of influential leaders of two of the three warring political factions. Although the third major political grouping was not in on the pre-*coup* discussions, officers representing its interests were included in the 13-man Supreme Military Council. The incumbent Prime Minister, Abdullah Khalil, was fully informed of the *coup* beforehand, and it had the blessing of the two most powerful behind-the-scenes political figures in the Sudan, the leaders of the rival Muslim religious brotherhoods, Ansar and Khatmiya.

Although the basic political situations in Lebanon and the Sudan are quite unlike, there are some striking similarities between the story of the rise of General Abboud and that of General Fuad Chehab to the presidency of Lebanon a few months earlier. In both cases, the incumbent each replaced had maneuvered himself into an untenable position vis-a-vis public opinion by becoming too closely identified with the United States (Lebanese President Camille Chamoun carried this much further than Khalil), and with a particular religious sect. With Chamoun, it was the Maronites; with Khalil, the

Helen A. Kitchen, who first went to northern Africa in 1944, has been professionally interested in the area ever since. She is now engaged in a number of independent research and writing projects focused chiefly on tropical Africa. Editor of the book, *The Press in Africa*, a pioneer study of African journalism published in 1956, Mrs. Kitchen also authored the nine articles on the Sudan featured in the special Sudanese issue of *Africa—Special Report*, January, 1959.

Ansar. Both Abboud and Chehab were selected because they were believed to be above politics and thus could be trusted not to play favorites among the rival internal political factions, the religious sects, or the country's solicitous external friends. The one major difference in procedure was that parliamentary government was maintained in Lebanon and the bargaining was almost a public process whereas in the Sudan negotiations went on in secret and without consulting one of the principal contenders for power. In each case, the implicit task of the new government was to get national policy back on a neutral but moderate course—i.e., to anticipate and ward off radical developments by striking a policy representative of a national consensus.

There were three major contestants for power in the Sudan when General Abboud and his carefully-balanced 13-man *junta* seized control in the early dawn of November 17. These were (1) the ruling Umma Party, headed by Prime Minister Khalil and sponsored by the Muslim religious brotherhood, Ansar; (2) the People's Democratic Party, discordant junior member of the governing coalition, sponsored by the Khatmiya brotherhood; and (3) the National Union Party of former Prime Minister Ismail al-Azhari (1954–1956), who made political history in 1956 by challenging the hold of the two religious brotherhoods on Sudanese politics and setting out to establish the N.U.P. as a secular party. Beyond these three principals, there were also the Southern Liberals, a very loosely organized coalition of 25 of the 38 parliamentary deputies representing some three million largely pagan tribal folk of the three southern provinces. Their role in the unfolding Sudanese political drama is only potentially important. There is also in the Sudan a small, well-organized Communist party which has concentrated its activities in the trade union movement.

Al-Azhari: First Premier

The Sudan came to independence under the National Union Party's al-Azhari. Although this able vote-getter campaigned for office in the first general elections of 1953 on a platform of unity with Egypt, al-Azhari in power turned out to be a remarkably responsive and responsible Sudanese nationalist. In

1955, while the condominium powers were still drawing up plans for a plebiscite to determine the sentiments of the Sudanese people about their future, al-Azhari suddenly took the initiative and rushed through Parliament, with a unanimous vote, a measure announcing Sudanese independence as a *fait accompli* to take effect January 1, 1956. The Prime Minister recognized that many Khatmiyas who voted for his ticket had opposed union with Egypt from the beginning, but had feared even more that an Umma victory might lead to the creation of a Sudanese monarchy headed by Sayyid Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi of the Ansar sect. But the decision to reverse his position reflected basically a dramatic change in Sudanese opinion on the issue of unity of the Nile after the departure in 1955 of the popular, half-Sudanese General Naguib from leadership of the governing council in Cairo.

Al-Azhari fell from office in 1956 because, to over-simplify a complex situation, he over-estimated how far he could go in defying the powerful sponsor of his party, Sayyid Sir Ali al-Mirghani al-Mahdi of the Khatmiya sect. Al-Mirghani, whose Khatmiya followers number some million and a half, many of them from northern towns, withdrew his blessing from the National Union Party and established a new Khatmiya organ, the People's Democratic Party. The fact that al-Azhari accepted his defeat with good grace in the best Anglo-Saxon parliamentary tradition was widely acclaimed at the time as evidence that parliamentary government was now a working thing in Khartoum and as an eloquent tribute to British tutelage.

Abdullah Khalil, a retired army general who had helped found the Umma Party in 1945, became premier at the head of a new coalition of Umma and People's Democratic Party deputies, supported by part of the southern contingent. This alliance between the P.D.P. and Umma was simply an extension of an unprecedented behind-the-scenes agreement between al-Mirghani of Khatmiya and al-Rahman of Ansar to set aside their own traditional rivalry in order to halt the rising star of the secular-minded and suspiciously charismatic al-Azhari. Actually, the issues which had once divided the Mirghani and Rahman families had lost most of their immediate relevance with the departure

of the British anyway. (The tension had begun when the Mirghanis rallied in support of Anglo-Egyptian forces during the Mahdist uprising of the 1880's, which had been led by the father of Sayyid Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi, Ansar leader until his death in April of this year. Although British officials had initially favored the Mirghani loyalists and dealt generously with them, the decision was made during World War I to restore Abd al-Rahman to his father's spiritual inheritance and give him a valuable section of land—which he subsequently developed into one of the most lucrative cotton holdings in the Sudan—as a reward for his successful effort to martial Sudanese opinion in support of the Allied cause. Bitterness over this latter day British favoritism for the Ansar was largely responsible for the Khatmiya's close ties with Egypt in the years immediately preceding independence.)

An Uneasy Coalition

The uneasy coalition of the Umma party, the People's Democratic party, and a varying group of southerners held together through the 1958 elections—which gave 63 out of 173 parliamentary seats to the Umma, 27 to the People's Democratic party, 45 to the National Union party, and 38 to the southerners. Although the government remained effectively in the hands of sectarian leaders, al-Azhari's 45 seats clearly proved that the Sudan had reached an important transitional point politically. The sects could not yet be beaten, but they could be challenged without committing political suicide.

Between the spring election and the military move in November, 1958, both the political and economic situation in the Sudan steadily worsened. The country's foreign exchange reserves had fallen dangerously low and much of three years' cotton remained unsold because of a pricing miscalculation in the wake of the Suez crisis, combined with a lowered world demand for long staple cotton. The government, especially Prime Minister Khalil, was under mounting pressure to "do something" about the economic crisis. The logical place for the pro-Western Khalil to seek financial help to pull the Sudan through its recession was from the West, but when he came up with a \$30 million loan offer from the United States and arms offers from

Britain, both his political opposition and the junior members of his coalition erupted violently. He was, they said, delivering the country back into the hands of colonialism. The June debate on the United States aid offer was long and bitter, with the most serious attacks coming from P.D.P. members of the government coalition. The enabling legislation was eventually passed, but no one felt very happy about it. American purposes in the area were particularly suspect in the months immediately after the Lebanese crisis, and Mr. Khalil's outspoken identification with the West was at cross-purposes with a growing popular sense of identification with the neutralist views of African and Arab nationalism.

Throughout 1958—indeed, even before the February elections—the press was full of talk of various kinds of coalitions to replace the disintegrating Umma-P.D.P. grouping. The problem was that none of the possible alignments offered much prospect for stability or longevity. Two days before the Ab-boud *coup*, the independent Khartoum daily *al-Ayam* reflected the national mood when it remarked disconsolately:

Nobody will be sorry to see the present government go. It has been the worst the Sudan has ever witnessed. It has given this country instability, misrule, disunity, and economic disaster. . . . But what is the alternative? Some people are in favor of a coalition between Umma and N.U.P., others support a coalition of P.D.P., N.U.P., and Southern Liberals. But none of these will give the Sudan the stability it aspires for. . . .

There were a number of factors which contributed to the calm manner in which the Sudanese accepted the end of parliamentary government in November without a shot being fired, a stone being thrown, a mob convening, a single Sudanese being arrested, or very many citizens even protesting verbally. First, of course, was the careful political planning at high levels which preceded it. Second, the *coup* was executed with such swift military precision that it was an accomplished fact before many people knew it had begun. Third, there was a profound sense of public relief at all levels at being rescued from the brink of a volcano. And, perhaps most important, the National Union party—which was the only major political

group not directly involved in the *coup*—apparently had the political sophistication to recognize that the institution of military rule, however sectarian its beginnings, would inevitably hasten the secularization of Sudanese politics. The N.U.P.'s long-term interests are clearly served by any break-down of the traditional system. Meanwhile, N.U.P. short-term interests were suitably represented in the Supreme Council announced by General Abboud.

The sequence of events in the Sudan since November has followed a logical pattern. General Abboud, assuming the role of arbiter rather than trail-blazer, has steered a most careful course. Although a Khatmiya by family inheritance, he set himself the delicate task of keeping both religious brotherhoods satisfied without permitting his government to be dominated by either. In effect, he heads a national coalition, composed of all parties except the southerners.

General Wahab

The March, 1959, crisis—in which three corps commanders staged a token march on Khartoum to demand a reshuffle in the sovereign Supreme Military Council—was partly a matter of personality conflicts among senior officers, but there were also important sectarian considerations and at least the shadows of some larger issues of national policy. The focal point of the disgruntled officers' dissatisfaction was Major General Ahmad Abd al-Wahab, the 44-year old Minister of Interior and Number Two man of the regime. Wahab had three counts against him. First, he had rubbed many of his fellow officers the wrong way because of his heavy-handed tactics in dealing with less able colleagues and subordinates. Secondly, the resemblance between Wahab and Gamal Abdel Nasser, not only physically but in developing political skill, was viewed with increasing alarm by some of his fellow-officers, who suspected the Minister of Interior of having personal ambitions commensurate with his abilities. These suspicions were enhanced when he began pressing for a return to civilian government. There was good reason to believe that General Wahab, who is a strong Ansar and the son-in-law of former Prime Minister Khalil, would emerge as the powerful head of a revived Umma party under a parlia-

mentary system. He had, moreover, the earmarks of a popular national figure and an effective vote-getter. Beyond these considerations, there was the complaint that the regime was still far too closely identified with the Western powers, that it had not moved back to the center position anticipated at the time of the *coup* and desired by a majority of the governing council, and that this was largely the fault of the admittedly pro-Western General Wahab.

General Abboud and the two sectarian leaders agreed that General Wahab had become too hot an issue and was expendable. The decision of Sayyid Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi to support Prime Minister Abboud's conclusion that it was politically wise to give in to the pressure and sack Wahab was not a popular one with the Ansar rank-and-file. It demonstrates, however, the remarkable leadership qualities and political acumen of this venerable religious leader. Abd al-Rahman apparently concluded, in company with Abboud and al-Mirghani, that entirely too much frustration was developing within the army and that it was advisable to let some steam out of the bubbling pot rather than to let matters reach a point where the whole thing would blow up. Implicit in the decision of the two sectarian leaders to support the Wahab ouster was their continuing faith in General Abboud and in his pledged devotion to the concept of sectarian balance.

Many in the Ansar were in a fighting mood, and General Wahab was bitter. But Abd al-Rahman held them in check, and Wahab retired in gentlemanly fashion after exchanging public statements of mutual esteem and good wishes with the reconstituted Supreme Council. The question which remains unanswered at this writing is whether Sayyid Siddiq Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi, who succeeded to leadership of the Ansar upon his father's death in April, 1959, will be strong enough to cope with the still-festering drive among many Ansars to seek redress for the Wahab ouster. If Siddiq is unable to hold the rank-and-file and Wahab in line behind his father's decision, he might be tempted to resort to militancy himself in order to enhance his prestige among his followers.

The March crisis, quite aside from its intrinsic drama, provides some new insights

into the military regime and its future. The most obvious generality that emerges is that General Abboud's personal position is by no means firmly entrenched, although no one yet is apparently questioning his leadership. There is every indication, nonetheless, that he lacks the assurance of a unified army to back up an unpopular decision, or at least a decision which does not represent an Ansar-Khatmiya consensus. His tenure would appear to be dependent on his ability to stay above the fisticuffs and arrange compromises. While he is a proven master at the art of peacefully resolving differences and has the important advantage (in Sudanese culture) of a decade of seniority on most of his colleagues, this is not a very productive basis on which to operate a government.

In effect, the Sudanese political situation has largely reverted to the pre-coup syndrome, except that the front men of the various political groupings are now senior army officers rather than civilian politicians. Parties remain dissolved, but their shadows are very much alive. For General Abboud, whose lifetime was spent in helping mold the Sudan Defense Force (now the Sudanese Army) into a hard-disciplined, spit-and-polish outfit with the most impressive military tradition in the Arab East except possibly Jordan's Arab Legion, there are probably moments of dismay at this development. Indeed, he is reportedly a tired and disillusioned man who stays on only because he is convinced that if he withdrew his prestige from the regime, it would set off a scramble for power that might well see blood flowing in the streets of Khartoum.

What worries many politically-sophisticated Sudanese is that the public bickering at the senior officer level which broke out in March will almost certainly encourage doubts among many who would not have dared to question the regime's suitability to Sudanese needs in its early months. Since it now appears increasingly unlikely that the Supreme Military Council—this one or any juggled derivative thereof—will be either willing or strong enough to return the country to civilian rule, the army itself almost certainly holds the key to the Sudan's future. Encouraged by hesitancy at the top, more secular-minded junior officers are already beginning to articulate their complaint that

the November revolt was a sham, since it was engineered by conservative civilian politicians and carried out by conservative generals as a means of institutionalizing the tradition-based *status quo*. In the minds of these younger officers, the real military revolution still lies ahead.

There is still a third body of opinion in the military which could profoundly influence the future of the Sudan. Among the officers who support the present regime, there are some—and these include the protesting corps commanders incorporated into the Supreme Council in March, spearheaded by Brigadier Abd al-Rahim Shennan—who are convinced that the present government can survive the social changes now going on in the Sudan only if it forsakes some of its aristocratic character and becomes more of a government of the people. They argue that only by stealing the radicals' thunder—as General Ayub has done in Pakistan—can a "colonel's revolt" on the Egyptian pattern be avoided in the Sudan.

Unity of the Nile?

This raises the whole question of Egypt's role in Sudanese politics. In order to put Egyptian-Sudanese relations into a meaningful perspective, it is essential to note that Cairo's preoccupation with what goes on in Khartoum has a sound, practical basis. The need for a friendly regime to the south was brought home forcefully in the wake of the Israeli-British-French invasion of Egypt in 1956, when rumors spread in Cairo that Britain was considering moving back into the Sudan in order to cut off the flow of the Nile to Egypt. For Egypt, whose entire economy—rural as well as urban—would collapse within a week without the all-important waters of the Nile, such a prospect—no matter how remote—is serious business indeed.

The concept of "unity of the Nile" was first espoused by Muhammad Ali some 180 years ago, when he sent 4,000 troops up into the vaguely defined land known as *Bilad al-Sudan* ("Land of the Blacks") to conquer and consolidate the various kingdoms of the upper Nile basin. Unity of the two peoples has continued to have varying degrees of sentimental appeal on both sides of the border, although this has tapered off very

sharply in the Sudan since independence. If Naguib had remained in power in Cairo, the whole history of the valley of the Nile since 1955 might have been quite different. For all practical purposes, Egyptian propaganda toward this particular end has fallen on deaf ears since the official decision to make the Sudan independent.

Nasser's Influence

For this reason, it is an over-simplification to talk these days of "pro-Egyptian" and "anti-Egyptian" cliques in Khartoum, and attach the same implications to these labels as were relevant before 1956. There is most certainly in Khartoum an important—and growing—segment of public opinion which rejects traditional political patterns and is responsive to President Nasser's view of the world and the place of Arabs and Africans in it. Many of this group—which includes younger army officers whose ties with the religious sects are far less secure than their fathers'—would like to remake the Sudan on the Egyptian pattern. But while they look northward for intellectual and political inspiration, and may eventually even seek technical or financial support there, very few have in mind delivering the Sudan to Egypt.

Partly in response to developments in Sudanese public opinion and partly as a result of other factors, Egyptian aims in the Sudan have altered considerably in recent years. Today, President Nasser would still undoubtedly welcome a Sudan signed, sealed and delivered as a province of the U.A.R. But there are growing signs that the U.A.R. leader, realistically facing up to the impossibility of binding the Arab world into a single entity at this time, is embarking on a new policy of co-existence. As long as the government in Khartoum remains non-hostile to Egypt, the prospects of direct U.A.R. intervention in the Sudan are now remote, although indirectly Egyptian newspapers and other propaganda media will continue to press for a closer affinity of views between the two capitals.

This more relaxed attitude on its Egyptian flank is a significant development as far as the Sudan is concerned. For one of the chief problems facing the country in establishing a sense of nationhood is to free itself from those

friends and neighbors who have long encouraged the traditional tribal and sectarian pattern of politics by aligning with various factions. Because the Sudan entered upon the world stage with a confident and well-trained leadership group and one of the most competent bureaucracies in Africa, it is easy to lose sight of the fact that the country lacked in 1956 almost all of the accepted prerequisites for national unity or democratic government. The Sudan is as large as all the NATO countries of Europe combined. It is sharply divided into a Muslim, Arabized north and a southern region of largely pagan tribal entities speaking some 32 separate languages and roughly 250 dialects. In short, the country came to independence with no tradition of religious, cultural, linguistic or political unity.

Secularization

It will take time, and quite possibly more pain, before the Sudan forges itself into a nation and resolves its relationships with the somewhat contradictory pulls of African and Arab unity. Although the sects still call the tune in Sudanese politics, the traditional structure is already crumbling at the edges and most of the younger Sudanese have been questioning for some time the political role of the religious brotherhood chiefs, even though they have seldom been able to withstand a direct bid from one of the venerable sectarian leaders. The death of Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi of the Ansar sect in April at the age of 73 may well speed up the secularization of the Sudan. His power was as much a derivative of his personal charisma as it was his supposedly inherited *baraka* (saintliness); the consensus of those who know his 47-year old son and heir is that Siddiq will not be able to call the tune among the million and a half Ansar with quite the same effectiveness.

In the long run, there is little doubt that the secular-minded Sudanese intelligentsia will replace the sectarian leaders as the politically decisive group in the Sudan. The question is whether the Sudanese will continue, as in the past, to negotiate their political and social transition at the conference table instead of in the streets.

Current Documents

RESOLUTIONS OF THE ALL AFRICAN PEOPLE'S CONFERENCE

More than 300 delegates representing 200 million Africans in 28 countries met at Accra, Ghana, from December 5 to 13, 1958; at a non-governmental conference. The group set up a permanent All African People's Conference with a secretariat in Accra, and also passed resolutions on racialism and discrimination, on imperialism and colonialism, on tribalism, religious separatism and traditional institutions, and on frontiers, boundaries and federations. The complete texts of these resolutions follow:

Conference Resolutions on Racialism and Discriminatory Laws and Practices

1. *PREAMBLE*

Whereas having heard shocking accounts of the brutal operation of racialism and discriminatory laws and denial of human rights on the continent of Africa from representatives of the participating organizations;

Whereas racialism is one of the outcomes of colonialism and the independence of states is a prerequisite for the end of discrimination;

Whereas Africans in the Union of South Africa, the Rhodesias, Nyasaland, Mozambique, Angola, Kenya, the Cameroons, Belgian Congo, Basutoland, South West Africa, and Kamerun are victims of a racialism that has reached alarming proportions;

Whereas racialism in Algeria has caused and is causing race extermination;

Whereas in a colonial country land belongs to a foreign power;

Whereas the problem of land in a colonial territory represents the ugliest form of colonial rule that must be destroyed so that African authorities own the land;

Whereas the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is being flouted in Africa and the Africans are deprived of the rights of man;

Whereas the recognition of, and respect for human dignity are the bases of a decent society;

Whereas those who practise racialism and discrimination are therefore out of step with the law;

Whereas colonial authorities do not respect international conventions;

Whereas democracy needs to be established immediately in Africa;

Whereas the colonial authorities have shown obstinate indifference towards resolutions adopted to set up a democracy;

Whereas the African must find concrete means of effectively reversing the situation;

Whereas Africa's destiny and political constitution must be forged by Africans themselves;

Be it resolved that this Conference registers its vehement protest against this ugly system;

Condemns the pernicious system of racialism and discriminating laws, especially as expressed in its extreme and most brutal forms in the Union of South Africa, Rhodesia, the Portuguese Territories of Angola, Mozambique, Principe, and Sao Thome, where the indigenous populations exist under a regime of "apartheid";

Condemns the lack of educational facilities and the denial of social benefits;

Condemns the denial of human democratic rights as enunciated in the charter of the United Nations;

Condemns racial segregation, reserve systems and all other forms of racial discrimination and color bar;

Condemns the use of forced labor in territories such as Angola, Mozambique, Belgian Congo, South and South-West Africa;

Condemns the political policies of territories like South Africa which base their minority rule of the majority upon apartheid's social doctrines;

Condemns the alienation of the African's best land for the use of European colonisers.

The All African People's Conference declares that as long as the system of discrimination and racialism remains on this African continent, it will arrest the development of the African peoples and stifle their self-expression;

Maintains that while discrimination continues to exist the problems facing Africa cannot be solved;

The All African People's Conference calls upon the United Nations to reconstitute the Committee on the Racial Situation in the Union of South Africa;

If the United Nations should fail to reconstitute this committee, this Conference calls upon the Secretariat of the independent States of Africa to set up such a committee.

The All African People's Conference declares that the struggle for the freedom of Africa is the task of the Africans themselves, and calls upon the workers, the peasants, and other sections of the toiling masses, together with the intellectuals, to unite their forces in common action for a final attack on discrimination and racialism;

Declares that political parties and leaders should recognize the need for a united front in the struggle for freedom and independence.

Convinced further that the overwhelming majority of the populations of the dependent territories have been made conscious of their rights under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;

The All African People's Conference RECOMMENDS:

1. That the permanent Secretariat to be set up should urge any African independent states which conduct trade with South Africa to impose economic sanctions against the latter country as a protest against racial discrimination which the European minority are practising to the humiliation of the non-European majority. Such economic sanctions should include the boycott of South African goods.

2. That all African countries which supply South Africa with migrant labor should organize this reservoir of workers for their own use and thus withhold such labor from South African industry which has become

the instrument of oppression. The permanent Secretariat should endeavor to give financial aid to any development plan that any country may have to initiate as a result of the diversion of its labor force.

3. That no African state should have any diplomatic relations with any country on our continent that practises race discrimination.
4. That April 15 should be set aside and called "African Freedom Day," which all African countries and all friends of Africa throughout the world shall observe as a rallying point for the forces of freedom.

5. That the permanent Secretariat should set up a bureau of information. Such a bureau should appoint correspondents in various African territories who will send factual news items relating to the Liberatory Movement to a central office for publication. The bureau should also be a depot from which liberatory journals in Africa will be circulated. This we believe will be not only a medium through which we shall get to know one another, but also through which we can co-ordinate our struggle.

6. That the Independent African States should form an "African Legion" consisting of volunteers who will be ready to protect the freedom of the African peoples.

7. That this conference insists on immediate independence for all African territories in order to put an end to racial discrimination in the spirit of the United Nations Charter.

8. That this Conference rejects the claim of Portugal that its colonies constitute part of metropolitan Portugal, and demands immediate independence for countries in Africa under Portuguese rule.

9. That this Conference, considering that the future of the Mandated Territory of South-West Africa has been debated at the United Nations for 12 successive years, and that the Herero, Nama, and other African inhabitants, who have been petitioning the United Nations during that time, still complain of the loss of their lands, and their humiliating subjection to the apartheid system, in this so-called sacred trust of civilization; that this Conference call on the Great Powers who entrusted the Mandate to South Africa, especially the United Kingdom, the United States, and France, together with other former members of the League of Nations, to revoke the Mandate and take im-

mediate steps to grant independence to South-West Africa.

10. That this Conference regards as unacceptable and discreditable any plan that would allow the incorporation into the Union of South Africa's apartheid system any African land or people, whether belonging to the Mandated Territory of South-West Africa, or the British Protectorates of Bechuanaland, Basutoland, and Swaziland.

11. That this Conference condemns the Central African Federation and all its discriminatory laws and practices which lead to social, cultural, economic and political racial consideration. Therefore, it calls upon the British Government to honor the declaration of human rights as entrenched in the United Nations Charter and dissolve the Central African Federation in the benefit of all people.

12. That, in respect of Kenya, this Conference urges the British Government to end the present state of emergency in Kenya and the release of all political prisoners. Also, that this Conference demands the abrogation of all discriminatory laws, the establishment of a common electoral roll based on adult suffrage with provision for one man, one vote, and the insertion of laws in the Statute Books for the transfer of the lands and rights to the African people.

Conference Resolutions on Imperialism and Colonialism

1. Whereas the great bulk of the African Continent has been carved out arbitrarily to the detriment of the indigenous African peoples by European Imperialists, namely Britain, France, Belgium, Spain, Italy and Portugal;

2. Whereas, in this process of colonization, two groups of Colonial territories have emerged, to wit:

- (a) those territories where indigenous Africans are dominated by foreigners who have their seats of authority in foreign lands, for example, French West Africa, French Equatorial Africa, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Gambia, Belgian Congo, Portuguese Guinea, Basutoland, Swaziland and Bechuanaland,
- (b) those where indigenous Africans are

dominated and oppressed by foreigners who have settled permanently in Africa and who regard the position of Africa under their sway as belonging more to them than to the African, e.g. Kenya, Union of South Africa, Algeria, Rhodesia, Angola and Mozambique;

3. Whereas world opinion unequivocally condemns oppression and subjugation of one race by another in whatever shape or form;

4. Whereas all African peoples everywhere strongly deplore the economic exploitation of African peoples by Imperialist Countries, thus reducing Africans to poverty in the midst of plenty;

5. Whereas all African peoples vehemently resent the militarization of Africans and the use of African soldiers in a nefarious global game against their brethren as in Algeria, Kenya, South Africa, Cameroons, Ivory Coast, Rhodesia, and in the Suez Canal invasion;

6. Whereas fundamental human rights, freedom of speech, freedom of association, freedom of movement, freedom of worship, freedom to live a full and abundant life as approved by the All African People's Conference on December 13th, 1958, are denied to Africans through the activities of Imperialists;

7. Whereas denial of the franchise to Africans on the basis of race or sex has been one of the principal instruments of colonial policy by Imperialists and their agents, thus making it feasible for a few white settlers to lord it over millions of indigenous Africans as in the proposed Central African Federation, Kenya, Union of South Africa, Algeria, Angola, Mozambique, and the Cameroons;

8. Whereas Imperialists are now co-ordinating their activities by forming military and economic pacts such as NATO, European Common Market, Free Trade Area, Organization for European Economic Cooperation, Common Organization in Sahara for the purpose of strengthening their Imperialist activities in Africa and elsewhere;

Be it resolved, and it is hereby resolved:

- 1. That the All African People's Conference vehemently condemns colonialism and imperialism in whatever shape or form these evils are perpetuated;
- 2. That the political and economic exploita-

tion of Africans by Imperialist Europeans should cease forthwith;

3. That the use of African manpower in the nefarious game of power politics by Imperialists should be a thing of the past;

4. That independent African States should pursue in their international policy principles which will expedite and accelerate the independence and sovereignty of all dependent and colonial African territories;

5. That fundamental human rights be extended to all men and women in Africa, and that the rights of indigenous Africans to the fullest use of their lands be respected and preserved;

6. The universal adult franchise be extended to all persons in Africa, regardless of race or sex;

7. That independent African States ensure that fundamental human rights and universal adult franchise are fully extended to everyone within their states, as an example to imperial nations who abuse and ignore the extension of those rights to Africans;

8. That a permanent secretariat of the All African People's Conference be set up to organize the All African Conference on a firm basis;

9. That a human rights committee of the Conference be formed to examine complaints of abuse of human rights in every part of Africa and to take appropriate steps to ensure the enjoyment of the rights by everyone;

10. That the All African People's Conference in Accra declares its full support to all fighters for freedom in Africa, to all those who resort to peaceful means of non-violence and civil disobedience as well as to all those who are compelled to retaliate against violence to attain national independence and freedom for the people. Where such retaliation becomes necessary, the Conference condemns all legislation which considers those who fight for their independence and freedom as ordinary criminals.

Conference Resolutions on Tribalism, Religious Separatism and Traditional Institutions

Resolution on Tribalism and Religious Separatism:

Whereas we strongly oppose the imperialist tactics of utilizing tribalism and religious separatism to perpetuate the colonial policies in Africa;

Whereas we are also convinced that tribalism and religious separatism are evil practices which constitute serious obstacles to—

- (i) the realisation of the unity of Africa
- (ii) the political evolution of Africa
- (iii) the rapid liberation of Africa,

Be it resolved that steps be taken by political trade union, cultural and other organizations to educate the masses about the dangers of these evil practices and thereby mobilize the masses to fight these evils.

That, in addition to any action taken by dependent countries, the independent countries shall: (a) allow their governments to pass laws and through propaganda and education, discourage tribalism and religious separatism;

(b) encourage their governments to give the dependent countries and their leaders effective aid in the fight to realize their common objectives rapidly.

Resolution on Traditional Institutions:

Whereas the All African People's Conference, convened in Accra from the 5th December to the 13th December, 1958, realizes that some of the African traditional institutions, especially chieftaincy, do not conform to the demands of democracy and

Whereas some of these institutions actually support colonialism and constitute the organs of corruption, exploitation and repression which strangle the dignity, personality and the will of the African to emancipate himself,

Be it resolved that those African traditional institutions whether political, social or economic, which have clearly shown their reactionary character and their sordid support for colonialism be condemned;

That all conscientious peoples of Africa and all African political leaders be invited to intensify and reinforce their educational and propaganda activities with the aim of annihilating those institutions which are incompatible with our objectives of national liberations;

And that Governments of independent countries be called upon to suppress or modify these institutions.

Conference Resolutions on Frontiers, Boundaries and Federations

1. WHEREAS the great mass of African

peoples are animated by a desire for unity;

WHEREAS the unity of Africa will be vital to the independence of its component units and essential to the security and general well-being of African peoples;

WHEREAS the existence of separate states in Africa is fraught with the dangers of exposure to imperialist intrigues and of resurgence of colonialism even after their attainment of independence, unless there is unity among them; and

WHEREAS the ultimate objective of African nations is a Commonwealth of Free African States;

BE IT RESOLVED, and it is hereby resolved by the All African People's Conference, that the Conference:

- (a) endorses Pan-Africanism and the desire for unity among African peoples;
- (b) declares that its ultimate objective is the evolution of a Commonwealth of Free African States;
- (c) calls upon the independent states of Africa to lead the peoples of Africa towards the attainment of this objective; and
- (d) expresses the hope that the day will dawn when the first loyalty of African states will be to an African Commonwealth.

2. WHEREAS, as a first step towards the attainment of the broad objective of an African Commonwealth, the independent states of Africa should amalgamate themselves on the basis of geographical contiguity, economic inter-dependence, linguistic and cultural affinity;

WHEREAS linguistic, religious and cultural divisions and national sovereignty should be subordinated to the overriding demands of Pan-African unity where common geographical and economic considerations and national interests suggest the grouping of certain states;

WHEREAS amalgamation, federation or groupings should only take place between independent states governed by Africans;

WHEREAS each state should decide to which group it wishes to adhere, by a referendum based on universal adult suffrage;

WHEREAS regional federations of groups should be regarded as a means to an end and should not be prejudicial to the ultimate objective of a Pan-African Commonwealth by hardening as separate entities and thereby impeding progress towards a continental Commonwealth;

WHEREAS the people of North Africa have taken the initiative towards a North African Federation, and there is a strong desire in West Africa for a West African Grouping;

WHEREAS it is desirable that other groups should emerge in Africa, provided they are not federations visualized or constituted by colonial powers against the wishes of the African people, since such federations are a ready weapon in the hands of colonial governments and white settlers for the oppression of the African people; and

WHEREAS countries which do not appear to fall naturally into any geographical group should, after their attainment of independence, decide by democratic processes whether to adhere to existing groups or to evolve different groups;

BE IT RESOLVED, and it is hereby resolved by the All African People's Conference, that the Conference:

- (a) endorses the desire in various parts of Africa for regional grouping of states;
- (b) advocates that such groupings should be based on three principles, namely:
 - (i) only independent states and countries governed by Africans should come together;
 - (ii) the establishment of groups should not be prejudicial to the ultimate objective of a Pan-African Commonwealth;
 - (iii) adherence to any group should be based on the wishes of the people ascertained by referendum on the basis of universal adult suffrage; and
- (c) recommends that countries which do

not appear to fall naturally within any group should decide by similar means whether to adhere to any group or to evolve different groups.

3. WHEREAS artificial barriers and frontiers drawn by imperialists to divide African peoples operate to the detriment of Africans, and should therefore be abolished or adjusted;

WHEREAS frontiers which cut across ethnic groups or divide peoples of the same stock are unnatural and are not conducive to peace or stability;

WHEREAS leaders of neighboring countries should cooperate towards a permanent solution of such problems which accords with the best interests of the people affected and enhances the prospects of realization of the ideal of a Pan-African Commonwealth of Free States;

WHEREAS the 20th February, 1959,¹ will be an important date in the history of the Cameroons, when a special session of the United Nations General Assembly will discuss the question of unification and independence of the territory;

BE IT RESOLVED, and it is hereby resolved by the All African People's Conference, that the Conference:

- (a) denounces artificial frontiers drawn by imperialist powers to divide the peoples of Africa, particularly those which cut across ethnic groups and divide people of the same stock;
- (b) calls for the abolition or adjustment of such frontiers at an early date;
- (c) calls upon the independent states of Africa to support a permanent solution to this problem founded upon the true wishes of the people;
- (d) notes with satisfaction that a special session of the United Nations General

Assembly will discuss the question of unification and independence of the Cameroons on the 20th February 1959.

Conference Resolution on Establishment of a Permanent Organization

WHEREAS the imperialist powers of Great Britain, France, Spain, Portugal, Belgium, and the Union of South Africa have, between them, deprived various people of Africa of their freedom and liberty; and

WHEREAS the leaders of political parties and trade unions in Africa gathered in Accra between the 5th day of December 1958 and the 13th day of December 1958, are irrevocably resolved to wage a final assault upon the denial of freedom, liberty and fundamental human rights to people of Africa;

BE IT RESOLVED that the All African People's Conference be established with a permanent secretariat in Accra, with the following aims and objects:

- (a) to promote understanding and unity among peoples of Africa;
- (b) to accelerate the liberation of Africa from imperialism and colonialism;
- (c) to mobilize world opinion against the denial of political rights and fundamental human rights to Africans;
- (d) to develop the feeling of one community among the peoples of Africa with the object of the emergence of a United States of Africa;

And that the Conference of the Secretariat should be governed by the rules approved for that purpose at this Conference.

¹ In two plebiscites supervised by the United Nations, 1.5 million inhabitants of the British Cameroon are to determine their status, according to the U.N. decision; the French Cameroon will become independent January 1, 1960, and will subsequently supervise its own elections.

"The basis of the immunity from self-incrimination is the feeling that it is inhuman and cruel to oblige individuals to cooperate in their own punishment. This seems to be the fundamental reason behind the right to silence enjoyed by those accused of crime. . . ."

—Robert F. Drinan, S.J., Dean, Boston College Law School, in an address delivered January 25, 1959.

ATTENTION DEBATERS!

CURRENT HISTORY's three-part study on labor problems in the United States and overseas provides valuable background material for the N.U.E.A. debate topic for 1959-1960: "What Policy in Labor-Management Relations Will Best Serve the Interests of the People of the United States?"

Three issues will deal with this topic:

AMERICAN LABOR PROBLEMS . . . June, 1959

Labor's Role in American Politics, by Harry Laidler, Executive Director Emeritus of the League for Industrial Democracy;
Organized Labor and the Consumer, by Colston Warne, Professor of Economics at Amherst College and President of Consumers Union;
Labor and Automation, by Kermit Eby, Professor of the Social Sciences at the University of Chicago and author of "Paradoxes of Democracy";
Union Welfare Funds, by Mark Starr, Educational Director of the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union;
Corruption and Union Racketeering, by John F. Bell, Professor and Chairman of the Department of Economics at the University of Illinois;
Wage and Hour Policies in Historical Perspective, by Milton Derber, Professor of Labor and Industrial Relations at the University of Illinois.

GOVERNMENT AND LABOR ABROAD . . . August, 1959

Government Regulation of Labor in a Democracy, by Murray Edelman, Professor of Political Science at the University of Illinois;
Government and Labor in West Germany, by Ludwig Erhard, Minister of Economy in the West German government;
Regulating Labor Unions in Britain, by Eric Wigham, British Labor Correspondent and author of "Trade Unions";
Organized Labor and the French Government, by Charles A. Micaud, at the Woodrow Wilson Department of Foreign Affairs of the University of Virginia;
Japanese Labor Regulation, by Benjamin Martin, labor columnist for the "Japan Times", completing a 3-year research project on Asian labor as a Ford Fellow;
Trade Unions and the State in the U.S.S.R., by Solomon M. Schwarz, author of "Labor in the Soviet Union";
Government and Labor in a Developing Economy, by George B. Baldwin, of the Harvard Advisory Group, Economic Bureau, Plan Organization at Tehran, Iran.

GOVERNMENT AND LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES

. . . September, 1959

Government and Labor Before the New Deal, by Dewey W. Grantham, Associate Professor of History at Vanderbilt University;
Government and Labor Relations during the New Deal, by Sidney Fine, Associate Professor of History at the University of Michigan;
Labor under the Taft-Hartley Act, by Sar A. Levitan of the Economics Division of the Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress;
Government and Labor under the Eisenhower Administration, by James P. Mitchell, U.S. Secretary of Labor;
Government and Labor during World War II, by Robert Murray, Associate Professor of American History at the Pennsylvania State University;
Current Legislation to Increase Government Regulation of Labor, by Monroe H. Freedman, Assistant Professor of Law, at George Washington University;
The Collective Bargaining Arena, by J. Gordon Logue, The Pennsalt Chemical Corporation

CURRENT HISTORY is also preparing a DEBATE GUIDE outlining all three of these labor issues to help student debaters.

SPECIAL REDUCED RATES: You may order copies of the three labor issues and the Debate Guide at special student rates: in orders of 5 or more copies of different issues, at 65¢ a copy; in orders of 5 or more copies of the same issue, at 50¢ a copy; 10 or more of the same issue, at 35¢; 30 or more of the same issue, at 30¢; 100 or more of the same issue, at 25¢ a copy. Single copy price, 85¢; single copies of the Debate Guide are 25¢. Single sets, including one copy of each of the three issues, at \$1.50 a set. To reserve your copies now, write the publication office, 1822 Ludlow Street, Philadelphia 3, Penna.

Received At Our Desk

New Books on Africa

CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN AFRICAN CULTURES. EDITED BY WILLIAM R. BASCOM AND MELVILLE J. HERSKOVITS. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959. 301 pages and index, \$7.00.)

Sixteen scholars whose research was conducted primarily at Northwestern University under its Program of African Studies are represented in this excellent study of various phases of African cultures, including music, art, languages, economics, religion and family customs. Maps, charts, and graphs add to the wealth of subject matter.

PORTUGUESE AFRICA. By JAMES DUFFY. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959. 343 pages, notes, index, maps and photographs, \$6.75.)

Because of her possession of Angola and Mozambique (Portuguese West and East Africa), Portugal ranks as the third largest colonial power. Her two African colonies, as Professor Duffy of Brandeis points out, are as large in area as Western Europe. Here Professor Duffy traces their history and discusses their problems in a definitive study of the area.

ETHIOPIA TODAY. By ERNEST W. LUTHER. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958. 152 pages and index, \$4.00.)

Ernest Luther was Economist for the State Bank of Ethiopia; for six years (1950-1956) he lived and travelled in that country. In this study he provides valuable background information on this little known independent kingdom.

The Middle East

IRAQ. By STEPHEN LONGRIGG AND FRANK STOKES. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959. 247 pages, insert map, appendices and index, \$6.50.)

One of the studies in the series on Nations of the Modern World, this is a broad general survey of Iraq's land, people, history, politics and government, by two competent and well-known authorities.

THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ: 1950-1957. By FAHIM I. QUBAIN. WITH A FOREWORD BY ROBERT STRAUSS-HUPE. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959. 262 pages and index, \$6.00.)

Dr. Qubain offers a careful study of economic development in Iraq between 1950 and 1957, including the development of agriculture, industry and human resources.

IRAQ. Its People, Its Society, Its Culture. EDITED BY THOMAS FITZSIMMONS. (New Haven: HRAF Press, 1958. 312 pages, tables, bibliography and index, \$7.00.)

Part of a series called "Survey of World Cultures," this study was prepared by George L. Harris in collaboration with six other specialists. As the publishers explain it, each book in the series focuses on "a society as it functions, the interrelationship of its parts and of the parts to the whole." The study was prepared by the Human Relations Area Files, a nonprofit research group affiliated with Yale University that provides reference files for member universities. This is a detailed account of the culture of Iraq, its government and its economic problems.

EGYPT. By TOM LITTLE. (New York, Frederick Praeger, 1959. 321 pages, bibliography, insert map and index, \$6.50.)

A study in the series of Nations of the Modern World, this book details the history of Egypt from ancient to modern times, including an analysis of the rise of Nasserism, by an outstanding British journalist.

SYRIA. A SHORT HISTORY. By PHILIP HIRTI. (New York: The Mac-

millan Company, 1959. 258 pages and index, \$4.50.)

Philip Hitti's outstanding *History of Syria including Lebanon and Palestine* was published in 1951. Readers will welcome this updated and condensed version, with an enlarged section on current developments in Syria.

JORDAN. A STATE OF TENSION. By BENJAMIN SHWADRAN. (New York: Council for Middle Eastern Affairs Press, 1959. 400 pages, bibliography and index. \$7.00.)

Here the editor of *Middle Eastern Affairs* surveys the long history of Jordan and evaluates her current tensions and her role in the Middle East today. Maps and photographs illustrate the text.

MIDDLE EAST IN CRISIS. By CAROL FISHER AND FRED KINSKY. (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1959. 203 pages, bibliography and index, \$5.00.)

This "historical and documentary review" consists of two sections: a brief historical survey and a selection of significant documents. Many of these are excerpts, yet the interested reader will find a good deal of background material here.

History and Politics

THE GREAT DEBATE ON CHARTER REFORM. A Proposal for a Stronger United Nations. By John Logue. (New York: Fordham University Press, 1958. 31 pages and appendix, \$5.00.)

This author urges the creation of a stronger United Nations, equipped to take on the functions of a world government, which can provide greater security than "increasing arms-competition" between the United States and the Soviet Union. World peace, according to John Logue, can be guaranteed only by disarming the nations of the world, except for their "national police forces," and by giving the United Nations military power capable of securing it. In order to make this proposal palatable to the neutralist nations of the world, he recommends that the revised United Nations also be empowered to legislate social and economic benefits.

POLITICAL ORIGINS OF THE NEW DIPLOMACY, 1917-1918. By ARNO J. MAYER. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959. 435 pages, bibliography and index, \$6.00.)

The nature of modern war has wrought a fundamental change in the scope of the political objectives for which it is allegedly fought. Limited wars are increasingly difficult to justify in democratic societies. Accordingly, they have been rationalized in terms of a sweeping idealism which cloaks national security needs in a mantle of morality. In an era of total wars, limited policy goals become politically objectionable.

Dr. Mayer analyzes the political dynamics responsible for the emergence of the "New Diplomacy" in this sophisticated, scholarly study of the conflicting pressures which dominated Europe during the critical period of the first World War. By "New Diplomacy" he refers to the vague formulations used by critics of "power politics," "secret diplomacy," "colonial empires," and so on to express imprecise, altruistic foreign policy objectives. Thus, advocates of the "New Diplomacy" expressed their aims in terms of "community of power," "open diplomacy," "disarmament," and "self determination of nations," ideas which, if adopted, they believed "would guarantee a future perpetual peace." The limitations of these ideological abstractions for political leaders in a democracy have been made painfully evident in recent years.

The author focuses on the period from March, 1917, to January, 1918; from the downfall of the Romanov dynasty in Russia and America's imminent entry into the war to Wilson's famous "Fourteen Point" declaration. Wilson made his speech to counteract the wave of disillusionment which spread through the European Left as a result of the publication, by the Bolsheviks, of the secret Czarist treaties with France and Great Britain. Dr. Mayer skillfully shows the impact upon the major powers and upon key political developments, of Wilson's utopian approach to world affairs. The oversimplified belief that the establishment of democratic insti-

tutions could assure democratic growth was to bring much tragedy to a weary Europe, weakened beyond its realization. This study provides valuable insights into a critical period of modern history. The intricate relationships between domestic and foreign policies is handled with clarity, taste and sensitivity.

—Alvin Z. Rubinstein
University of Pennsylvania

IN THE SHADOW OF RUSSIA. By NICHOLAS HALASZ (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1959. 390 pages and index, \$5.00.)

This book will appeal particularly to the interested non-specialist. It traces the recent history of Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Albania, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, analyzing the effects of two World Wars upon their development, and proceeds to assess their role and future within the framework of the Soviet empire.

More than half the book is devoted to the pre-1946 period. Complex economic, political and social history is handled with ease. The reader comes away with a better understanding of the diversity that is Eastern Europe, a phenomenon too often ignored in the West. Mr. Halasz concludes with lengthy chapters on the Soviet occupation and domination of the area. The enormous amount of material which he seeks to incorporate will not be new to the student of the period, but it is presented dispassionately.

—A.Z.R.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF COMMUNIST CHINA. By CHO-H-MING LI (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1959. 284 pages, bibliography, index, and statistical appendix, \$7.50.)

During the past year the dramatic news out of Communist China has centered on the massive program of organizing 650 million Chinese into communes. One important reason for this unparalleled effort at regimentation is the desire of the leadership to accelerate even more China's rate of economic growth. In general, reliable information on China's economic development is hard to come by.

Professor Li's study of the results of Peking's First Five Year Plan, which was completed in 1957, should do much to fill the gaps in our knowledge of Communist China's progress in industrializing and promoting its economic development. In developing his analysis, he has relied almost exclusively upon Chinese Communist sources, a commendable feat of research and persistence in itself. His study will appeal primarily to the expert. It is well provided with statistical tables, and the documentation seems excellent. After a fine introductory chapter, the author analyzes, in subsequent chapters, Industrial Development, Agricultural Development, National Product: Structure and Growth, 1952-1957, Net Capital Formation, 1952-1957, Internal Financing, External Financing and Export Drive, and Prospects: Some Strategic Factors of Growth.

The rate of growth will depend "on the state's ability to keep the people reasonably satisfied with a low level of consumption." In addition, the Communist regime must cope with two critical problems: the rising birth and burgeoning population, and the productivity of agriculture. In general, the author concludes that "the speed of industrialization in the future will depend, from the economic standpoint, on the availability of export markets, the rate of population growth, the level of domestic consumption, and above all, the increase of agricultural output."

—A.Z.R.

MATTHIAS ERZBERGER AND THE DILEMMA OF GERMAN DEMOCRACY. By KLAUS EPSTEIN (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959. 473 pages, appendix, bibliography and index, \$10.00.)

This is the definitive biography of one of the key personalities in German politics "before and during the First World War and in the formative years of the Weimar Republic." Matthias Erzberger achieved prominence as a member of the Reichstag under the Kaiser and after 1918 emerged as a champion of democracy. A controversial and courageous individual, he was instrumental in bringing about Germany's ratification of the Treaty of Versailles, which irrevocably marked him for elimina-

tion by the infuriated nationalists and conservatives.

Dr. Epstein has based his fascinating account upon a wealth of documentary material, including the private papers of Erzberger. Not only is this the dramatic biography of a figure who was long at the center of German politics; it also affords many illuminating insights in the power struggles which dominated the early twentieth century in Germany. The bulk of the study focuses on Erzberger's activities during the first World War. Particular attention is devoted to his role in attempting to negotiate an end to the war in 1917. Recognizing Germany's desperate plight following the failure of the submarine war, Erzberger suddenly realized "the anachronistic nature of an international system based upon sovereign states that inevitably led to bloody and fruitless wars." His attempts to set Germany upon a new path is scrupulously documented, interestingly presented; and cogently analyzed. This is biography at its best.

—A.Z.R.

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THE IMPERIAL IDEA AND ITS ENEMIES. By A. P. Thornton. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1959. 356 pages, appendix and index, \$7.50.)

A professor of history at the University College of the West Indies analyzes the enemies of the imperial idea: war, nationalism and democracy. The author believes that British imperialism was linked with liberalism and that "imperial ideas bred in the liberal tradition will always find their enemies, but it is still the imperialist who has the advantage, as to him falls the initiative."

THE COMMONWEALTH IN THE WORLD. By J. D. B. Miller. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958. 304 pages and index, \$5.00.)

Professor Miller deals with the historical background of the commonwealth and with its future, as well as with the interests and policies of each of the member nations.

THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF WESTERN CIVILIZATION. By Shepard B. Clough. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1959. 493 pages and index, \$7.50.)

Economic development from the ancient world through the medieval and into the present is the ambitious scope of this study, in which, as Professor Clough points out, he has tried "to organize economic data around the central theme of economic growth and to relate that theme to human strivings for civilization."

GOVERNMENT IN GREAT BRITAIN, THE EMPIRE AND THE COMMONWEALTH. By L. D. White and W. D. Hussey. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1959. 274 pages, appendix, book list, glossary, and index, \$3.00.)

A convenient, brief and accurate summary of government in the empire and the commonwealth, revised and brought up to date in this second edition.

CONTEMPORARY CANADA. By Miriam Chapin. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959. 320 pages, notes and index, \$7.00.)

A professional journalist and author of two other books on Canada, Mrs. Chapin offers here a readable and comprehensive survey of Canada's geography, politics and people, her difficulties with two nationalities and her relations to the commonwealth and the world.

POEMS PARTLY AMERICAN. By A. L. Rowse. (London: Faber & Faber, 1959. 71 pages, \$1.75.)

When *Current History's* contributing editor, and famed Elizabethan scholar, Alfred Leslie Rowse, produces his fourth book of poems, we are pleased to review it in these columns. His poems are not in the modern vein, probing for meaning; instead, he writes of people, places, moments and emotions he finds meaningful, "intent on the life of dream and inner ecstasy."

His poetry has subtle rhythms and the lyrical passages are lovely.

The Month In Review

INTERNATIONAL

African-Asian Economic Cooperation

May 1—It is reported from Bandung that the consultative committee of the proposed African-Asian Economic Cooperation Organization has agreed to limit membership to nations that participated in the 1955 Bandung Conference, plus African and Asian nations that have since gained independence. This prevents Russian membership.

Berlin Crisis

May 1—U.S. Secretary of State Christian A. Herter confers with French Premier Michel Debré in Paris, where 4-Power talks on the Berlin situation ended yesterday. Herter subsequently departs for Washington.

May 2—French Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville reports to the Permanent Council of the Nato nations on the 4-Power meetings in Paris April 29–30. Nato delegates are reported to have received the Western package proposal on Berlin and German reunification with approval “as far as it goes.”

In a speech in Copenhagen, U.N. Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld suggests that the Big Four might put the Berlin question before the U.N. if they fail to reach agreement among themselves.

May 5—U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower tells newsmen that summit talks are a “foregone conclusion” if they can promote world peace.

May 9—The official text of Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev’s interview with West German editors of Socialist newspapers is published. It is revealed that Khrushchev told the group of editors that only 8 hydrogen bombs are needed to destroy completely West Germany.

Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko calls for the end of the Allied occupation of West Berlin.

Conflict over preparations for the foreign ministers meeting in Geneva arises over whether or not East and West Germany should be represented as sovereign equals with the Big Four powers. East Germany is not recognized by the U.S.

May 11—The Geneva conference of the foreign ministers of the U.S., the U.S.S.R., Britain and France begins after settling the status of the German delegates. East and West German delegates will act only as advisers.

May 12—The Soviet Union asks that Poland and Czechoslovakia be admitted to the Geneva conference, a proposal rejected by the U.S., France and Great Britain.

May 13—The three Western nations at Geneva reaffirm four-power responsibility for Berlin and a German settlement. They criticize the Soviet stand that these problems are Germany’s domestic responsibility.

May 14—The Western proposals on German reunification, on Berlin’s status, and inspection and disarmament in Europe are laid before the Geneva conferees. The Western plan provides for re-uniting Berlin by free elections, for a mixed East and West German commission to set up the electoral basis for unifying Germany, and for a demilitarized zone in Europe if a unified Germany joins either the Warsaw or the Nato pacts.

A Moscow broadcast carries a speech by Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev in which he reiterates his demand for a free city of Berlin, whose right to deal with outside countries would be guaranteed by East Germany.

May 15—Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko, presenting Moscow’s plan, asks France, Britain, and the U.S. to sign a peace treaty with both East and West Germany and to withdraw from Berlin. The Russian leader also calls for the re-

removal of foreign Nato bases and the return of Nato forces to their native lands, in exchange for a Soviet troop drawback from Germany, Hungary and Poland.

Khrushchev, on receiving the Lenin Peace Prize in Moscow, declares that the West's package deal on Germany must be broken up because it contains certain points which can be accepted "separately." However the questions of a peace treaty with two Germanies and the demilitarization of Berlin must take precedence.

May 18—U.S. Secretary of State Christian A. Herter tells the Geneva foreign ministers why the U.S.S.R.'s plan for a peace treaty with two separate Germanies is unacceptable.

Gromyko tells the conference that the Soviet Union cannot accept the Western package plan, but will discuss separate Western proposals such as a limited arms zone in Europe.

The Western powers refuse to break up their package plan, although they are willing to discuss their proposals one by one.

May 19—*The New York Times* reports that a modified draft treaty has been prepared by the Western powers, to be negotiated with a unified Germany.

May 21—Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld refuses to set up a U.N. military garrison in West Berlin. One of Gromyko's alternatives has been to replace Western troops with neutral U.N. forces.

May 22—The Geneva talks appear deadlocked with the Soviet refusal to negotiate German unification and the Western rejection of the Soviet treaty with two Germanies.

May 24—It is reported that East Germany is willing to act as a Soviet agent in maintaining West Berlin's links with the rest of the world, provided the Western powers recognize the principle of a free Berlin.

May 25—Andrei Gromyko tells the Geneva meeting that his country will mark the ministers' progress by how close they come to accepting the Soviet draft treaty for Germany. Gromyko concedes that if East and West Germany agree to the Western suggestion for an all-German committee, his country would concur "in principle."

May 27—U. S. President Eisenhower meets with West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and Secretary Herter, who are

in Washington to attend the funeral of U.S. Secretary of State John F. Dulles.

The six month deadline the Russians set for settling the Berlin crisis last November 27 expires.

May 28—After talks with U.S. President Eisenhower, the 4 foreign ministers of France, Britain, the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. hold their first private talks (as previously agreed) during their return flight to Geneva.

May 29—At the opening of private talks at the Big Four ministers meeting in Geneva, the Western powers tell Russian Minister Gromyko that the Soviet Union must recognize the right of the Western powers to be in Berlin. Gromyko restates his 3 alternatives for Berlin: 1) demilitarize the city; 2) station neutral troops in the city; or 3) install a "token" force of Soviet, U.S. British and French soldiers there.

May 30—British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd advises the foreign ministers to negotiate on Berlin's status, "leaving the present situation basically as it is and . . . improve it in certain respects" agreeable to both East and West.

Premier Khrushchev in Albania tells Western foreign ministers now in Geneva that the Soviet Union will not negotiate the Berlin situation on a "concession for concession" basis. He stands firm on his demand for a demilitarized free city of Berlin. Condemning Western proposals Khrushchev declares that he is hoping for a "reasonable solution . . . which would not harm either side." (See also *Albania*).

Disarmament

May 6—A noncontroversial fifteenth article of the proposed treaty banning nuclear testing is adopted by the U.S., Britain and the Soviet Union. The article provides for legal status and diplomatic immunity so that the treaty organization and staff can function. Details have not been worked out.

May 8—The U.S. says it will study the latest Russian proposal for a specified number of on-site inspections where there is suspicion of forbidden nuclear testing.

May 14—Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko urges the U.S. and Britain to sign the articles of the test ban treaty that have been agreed on; the Western powers refuse and ask instead that scientists confer

on unresolved technical difficulties.

May 16—Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev says the U.S.S.R. is willing to hold talks on the possibility of detecting nuclear explosions in outer space only. Western representatives say he does not clarify proposed on-site inspection of suspected nuclear blasts.

May 22—The U.S. and Britain decide to postpone efforts to reach agreement with the U.S.S.R. on holding a scientific conference concerned with all types of nuclear explosion detection. Soviet delegates agree to confer only on outer space explosions.

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

May 11—The fourteenth session of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade opens in Geneva. W. T. Beale, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs, asks members to change their trade policies and eliminate bans on dollar imports.

May 14—Member states of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade support Israel's request for membership; only Pakistan and Indonesia indicate opposition.

May 18—Poland's request for membership in Gatt is referred to a working group for further consideration. Czechoslovakia is the only Communist member of Gatt, having joined before her Communist government was established.

May 30—A "three year moratorium" on discussion of West Germany's import restrictions is established by Gatt members. Agreement is reached on changing some of the German restrictions but details remain secret. The Netherlands reveals plans to drop all restrictions on dollar and other imports formerly set up because of balance of payment difficulties.

Geneva Talks (See *Berlin Crisis*.)

Nato

(See also *Iceland*, May 23.)

May 7—After Soviet protests at bilateral pacts between the U.S. and Greece, the Netherlands, West Germany and Turkey, the North Atlantic Council issues a communiqué denying that the agreements are aimed at destroying the success of East-West negotiations. (The agreements pro-

vide for training military forces in four countries in the use of "modern"—and presumably nuclear—weapons and the introduction of these weapons.)

May 26—President Eisenhower asks Congress to approve agreements to allow the U.S. to help train and equip four Nato allies—Canada, West Germany, Turkey and the Netherlands—for nuclear warfare. The agreement with Greece is not submitted at this time.

Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev threatens to establish missile bases in Albania if the U.S. establishes rocket bases in Italy and Greece. (See also *Albania*.)

United Nations

(See also *International*, *Berlin Crisis*.)

May 4—Paul G. Hoffman, managing director of the United Nations Special Fund, says he has recommended 13 projects totalling \$7.5 million to supplement regular programs of assistance for underdeveloped areas.

May 21—Following a U.N. General Assembly request to all governments to observe a World Refugee Year beginning in June, a conference on refugees opens in Washington to discuss what the U.S. can do to aid the program.

May 31—The Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the U.N. releases the annual Demographic Yearbook showing that the rate of increase in the world's population is about 45 million yearly.

Western Hemisphere Affairs

May 14—At the eighth session of the U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America (E.C.L.A.) economists meet at Panama to discuss the establishment of a common Latin American market. All 21 American republics are represented. (See also *Cuba*, May 2.)

May 19—The Trade Committee of the U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America votes unanimously to support a resolution on a common market and asks a group of specialists to work out a draft agreement.

ALBANIA

May 28—In the midst of Soviet Premier Khrushchev's visit to Albania, Communist Chinese Defense Minister Peng Teh-huai arrives in the Albanian capital. Mr. Khrushchev issues a statement urging

Greece to become neutral, condemning the establishment of Nato bases in Europe, and warning that Soviet bases in Albania could powerfully retaliate against Greece and Italy.

May 29—The U.S. State Department issues a formal statement that recent remarks made by Khrushchev for a "peninsula of peace" in the Balkans may jeopardize summit talks, or any other negotiations.

ARGENTINA

May 5—It is announced that Argentina has received loans and surplus agricultural products from the U.S. government and private companies equaling \$350 million.

May 14—Foreign Minister Carlos Florit's resignation is announced. Other Cabinet members have also resigned.

May 22—President Arturo Frondizi swears in 2 Cabinet officers, Foreign Minister Diogenes Taboada and Secretary of Agriculture Angel Lagomarsino.

AUSTRIA

May 10—Elections are held for the National Assembly, following the break-up of the coalition government composed of Socialists and People's party members. Chancellor Julius Raab's conservative People's party loses 3 seats and retains 79. The Socialists, with a majority of the popular vote, gain 4 seats for a total of 78, and the Freedom party takes 8. The Communists lose their 3 seats in the 165-member assembly.

May 14—President Adolf Schaerf asks Chancellor Raab to form a new government; the coalition government resigned formally 2 days ago.

May 21—It is announced that Raab has asked the Socialists to remain in the coalition government with his People's party.

BELGIUM

May 10—King Baudouin leaves for a 3-week visit to the U.S.

Belgian Congo

May 13—Three leaders of the illegal Abako Congolese Nationalist Association, arrested and brought to Belgium on an educational tour after the January riots, return to Leopoldville.

BRAZIL

May 7—Brazil approves the nomination of

John M. Cabot as ambassador from the U.S.

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH; THE (see also *International, Berlin Crisis*)

Canada

May 10—Alberta's Premier, E. C. Manning, reveals that a general election will be held in Alberta June 18; June 4 will be Nomination Day.

May 20—A formal diplomatic note from Canada is delivered in Washington suggesting a method of settling differences on the employment of St. Lawrence Seaway pilots.

May 25—The U.S. and Canada sign a pact arranging for cooperation for mutual defense in the field of atomic energy.

Ceylon

May 23—Prime Minister S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike extends this session of Parliament to June 30 and cancels the May 26 meeting of the House of Representatives.

May 28—Ceylon and Communist China agree to exchange Ceylonese rubber for Chinese rice.

Ghana

May 23—The Government reveals that an inquiry commission says that two Opposition politicians are guilty of conspiracy to murder Prime Minister Kwame Nkrumah and overthrow the Government. R. R. Amponsah, general secretary of the United party, and M. K. Apaloo, a United party M.P., have been in jail since December in accord with provisions of the preventive detention act.

Great Britain

May 7—The U.S. and the United Kingdom amend their agreement to cooperate in using atomic energy for defense so that equipment and materials can be exchanged.

May 8—In local elections, the Conservative party gains some strength.

May 10—Sir Winston Churchill returns to London after a 6-day visit to the U.S.

May 12—Prime Minister Harold Macmillan tells the House of Commons that "substantial but modest sums" are planned for a program to build an earth satellite.

May 24—Britain signs a 5-year trade agreement with the U.S.S.R. in Moscow.

May 28—The Board of Trade ends quotas on imports of some 45 groups of consumer goods from dollar areas; quotas on other goods are increased. Tariff rates remain the same.

The National Coal Board reveals that coal production in 1958 declined to its lowest figure in 8 years.

India

May 1—Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru opens the \$28 million Ganges River bridge.

May 4—Nehru tells the upper house of Parliament that he does not "propose to have a military alliance with any country, come what may," ruling out a military arrangement with Pakistan.

May 8—Nehru warns that China should not attempt to frighten India with "warlike speeches."

May 14—Nehru refuses to meet with Pakistan's President, Mohammed Ayub Khan.

May 31—It is reported in Geneva that Nehru has asked the international supervisory commission for Laos to be reconvened.

Malaya

May 20—Voting in the first major election in 4 years, Malaysians assure victory to Tengku Abdul Rahman's Alliance party in two state elections, in Perlis and in Kedah.

Rahman's Alliance party wins all 20 seats in the state of Malacca.

May 27—The Alliance party wins 31 out of 40 seats in the House of Assembly in Perak State. Seven state elections have not yet been held.

South Africa

May 26—M.D.C. de Wet Nel, Minister of Bantu Development, opens a session of the Transkeian Territorial Authority, termed by the Nationalists the first South African Bantustan Government.

May 27—Justice Minister Charles R. Swart forbids Albert Luthuli to attend any kind of gathering in South Africa for five years. Luthuli is president general of the African National Congress.

BRITISH EMPIRE, THE

British Cameroons (See *Nigeria*.)

Cyprus

May 7—Bishop Photios of Paphos, second to Archbishop Makarios as head of the Cyp-

riote Church, abdicates after unfriendly demonstrations in Paphos when he returned after 3 years overseas.

Nigeria

May 1—It is revealed in Lagos that Lieutenant Colonel Sir John Dring has been appointed to administer the plebiscites in the Cameroons. The Northern Cameroons, now administered as a section of Northern Nigeria, will vote in November; the Southern Cameroons, a region within the Nigerian Federation with its own legislature, will hold its plebiscite early in 1960.

May 15—Queen Elizabeth II sends a message to 10,000 North Nigerian tribesmen celebrating self-government; internal self government was achieved March 15 but the celebration was postponed because March 15 fell during the holy month of Ramadan of the Muslim calendar. The eastern and western sections of the country became autonomous in 1958.

May 25—British Colonial Secretary Alan Lennox-Boyd promises Nigerian officials that a law guaranteeing fundamental human rights will be completed in June or July. The law is designed to guarantee the rights of minority tribes after Nigeria becomes independent in 1960.

May 26—Alan Lennox-Boyd tells the regional prime ministers and the Federal Prime Minister that British technical and financial aid to Nigeria will continue after independence. Elections for a government to rule independent Nigeria will be held early in December.

May 28—The British Governor General announces that he will administer the trust territory of the Southern Cameroons directly between December, 1959, and April, 1960, by which time a plebiscite is expected. The territory, part of Nigeria, has voted not to participate in Nigeria's elections.

Singapore

May 28—Lim Yew Hock, chief minister, reveals a failure of efforts to set up a united front against the Left-wing People's Action party before the general election May 30. Voting will focus on 51 seats in the General Assembly.

May 30—In a landslide victory, the Leftist People's Action party wins 43 of 51 seats in the General Assembly that will establish

Singapore's first government fully autonomous in the field of internal affairs.

May 31—The People's Action party refuses to form a government until some of its Left-wing extremists are released from prison.

Uganda

May 6—Augustine Kamyia, chairman of the Uganda National Movement, is sentenced to 18 months in jail after conviction for threatening violence.

May 22—Governor Sir Frederick Crawford outlaws the Uganda National Movement and invokes a type of martial law in the Kingdom of Buganda by declaring it a "disturbed area."

May 23—The Government threatens press censorship if news about the Uganda National Movement is published.

May 24—A new organization, the Uganda Freedom Movement, replaces the outlawed Uganda National Movement.

BURMA

May 3—A Soviet official is forcibly escorted to the Burma airport for a return trip home. The official is suspected to be Colonel Mikhail I. Stryguine, Soviet military attache, who had attempted to escape from the hospital.

May 18—Burmese troops begin an offensive against some 5000 Chinese Nationalists in the border jungles alongside Communist China.

May 22—It is confirmed that Burma has asked for revision of the 1954 treaty with Japan setting up reparations for World War II's damages.

CHILE

May 11—It is announced that the U.S. Export-Import Bank and private U.S. banks will loan Chile \$100 million.

CHINA (Nationalist)

May 15—Kuomintang party leaders meet with President Chiang Kai-shek to re-elect the 15-man Central Committee.

CHINA (The People's Republic)

May 16—A report by recent visitors to Communist China is disclosed: in the southern provinces commune restrictions have been eased.

May 17—The Communist Chinese shell the Nationalist offshore islands for 90 min-

utes. Eight persons are wounded and 3 are killed.

May 18—Communist China's claims to have constructed a tremendous number of hydroelectric and irrigation projects are reported. Some 76 million cubic feet of earthwork and masonry have been completed.

May 19—U.S. Ambassador Jacob Beam meets in Warsaw with Communist Chinese Wang Ping-nan for talks.

May 25—The Peking radio accuses the Laotian army of violating the Indochina agreement by attempting to disarm a Communist rebel battalion in north Laos.

CUBA

May 1—An estimated 500,000 workers march in a May Day celebration, demonstrating support for the Castro regime.

May 2—Premier Fidel Castro, in Argentina, tells the Inter-American Committee of Twenty-one that the U.S. should give Latin America \$30 billion in aid over the next 10 years for its development.

It is announced that the Confederation of Cuban Workers has asked President Manuel Urrutia Lleo to consider its demands for wage increases and an armed workers' militia.

May 11—Castro announces that all war criminals and members of the Batista regime will be tried in civil courts hereafter. The death penalty will be limited to revolutionary crimes involving loss of life and to misappropriation of government funds.

May 13—The property of 117 companies and 18 persons is confiscated by the government.

May 16—The pro-Castro newspaper, *Revolucion*, strongly attacks Cuban Communists.

May 17—The Cabinet approves and President Urrutia signs an agrarian reform bill prohibiting foreigners or foreign companies to own land or hold stock in Cuban companies. American sugar companies will face land expropriation unless stock is transferred to Cuban citizens not associated with the sugar mills. The law also provides for land distribution to tenants and squatters of 66 acres per family.

May 23—The Cabinet and President Urrutia adopt a resolution under which the government will take control tomorrow of

7 Cuban airlines and airports. The Cabinet also orders the price of beef lowered.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

May 16—Some 300,000 Sudeten Germans, mainly residing in West Germany, meet in Vienna to reassert their claim to their Sudeten homes in Czechoslovakia.

May 18—The meeting of the Sudeten Germans ends.

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

May 17—The twenty-ninth anniversary of Generalissimo Rafael Trujillo's reign is celebrated.

FRANCE (See also *International, Berlin Crisis.*)

May 4—The Executive Council of the French Community meets. Agreement on currency, fiscal and economic policy is reported.

May 5—The French Community's Court of Arbitration is sworn in. The Executive Council adjourns its 2-day meeting.

May 7—The U.S. and France sign an agreement under which the U.S. will sell France uranium for atomic power plants, particularly for "a land based prototype submarine nuclear propulsion plant."

President Charles de Gaulle tells Frenchmen that a "pacified" Algeria is "in sight," an Algeria which will voluntarily "remain forever linked to France."

May 13—The May 13, 1958, uprising in Algeria when the French Army took control is marked.

May 20—Ivory Coast leader Felix Houphouët-Boigny resigns as Minister of State in the French government.

May 26—Premier Michel Debré strongly criticizes the National Assembly for trying to insert into the Assembly's rules a provision allowing resolutions to be introduced for a vote.

May 28—Two Cabinet ministers who resigned from their posts when elected to the French Senate are replaced: Pierre Chatenet is named Minister of the Interior and Henri Rochereau is named to the Ministry of Agriculture.

May 29—France reports that she owes \$3 billion in foreign debts.

FRENCH OVERSEAS COMMUNITY, THE Algeria

May 2—French President Charles de Gaulle

removes Deputy Secretary of the Algerian Administration André Regard.

May 5—Disturbances rage in Constantine in Algeria. French youths stage an anti-de Gaulle demonstration. Arabs protesting against an attack on their people by 1,000 French settlers last night are turned back by police.

Minister of Culture in the Algerian provisional government Tewfik el Medani reports from Cairo that the Algerian rebel army is losing 500 men each day, and that 750,000 Algerian rebels have been killed since 1954.

May 6—A leader of the Algerian Front of National Liberation asks the United Nations to consider the Algerian war.

May 14—The Algerian Provisional government charges that U.S. military equipment is being brought to Algeria to replace outworn supplies, in violation of U.S. assurances to the contrary. The U.S. denies it ever gave such assurances.

May 18—Algerian rebel leaders meet with King Mohammed V of Morocco.

May 19—The Algerian nationalist Minister of Liaison and Communications accuses the U.S. of preventing arms shipments to rebel forces.

May 20—The Algerian National Liberation Front reveals that its mission to Communist China to solicit military supplies was successful.

May 22—The French Army warns 17 extremists of European descent to halt their anti-de Gaulle activities, or face army service or eviction from Algeria.

May 24—Muslims and Europeans in Algeria begin the campaign for elections to the French Senate.

May 26—Nine African states (Liberia, Libya, Tunisia, Morocco, the Sudan, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea and the U.A.R.) announce plans for a conference in Liberia in early August to discuss the Algerian problem.

May 27—The French Cabinet approves 3 measures designed to strengthen Algeria's ties with France. The Assembly will debate the bills early in June.

May 28—The U.N.'s Afro-Asian bloc agreement to take the Algerian question to the General Assembly is announced.

May 29—The Algerian Provisional Government states that it will negotiate with the French on neutral soil only.

May 31—Grand electors choose 32 Senators (20 Muslims and 12 Europeans) to represent Algeria in the French Senate. The trend of the voting is reported to be a reversal for the extreme Rightists who provoked the May 13, 1958, upset. "Liberal" candidates representing a "third force" in Algerian politics are leading.

Dahomey

May 9—The Dahomey Democratic Union leader, Hubert Maga, is reported to have refused to form a government. The elections were held April 2.

May 27—A cabinet has been formed by the new Premier, Hubert Maga, composed of members of the Dahomey Democratic Rally, the Dahomey Republican Party, and the Dahomey Democratic Union.

Ivory Coast

May 1—Felix Houphouet-Boigny is invested as Ivory Coast Premier (see also *France*).

Malgache Republic

(Madagascar)

May 1—Philibert Tsiranana is elected president of this autonomous republic.

Mauritania

May 18—The Mauritanian Regroupment party wins all 40 Territorial Assembly seats in uncontested elections today.

GERMANY, THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF

(See also *International, Berlin Crisis*.)

May 20—Qualified sources reveal that West Germany is willing to negotiate non-aggression pacts with Poland and Czechoslovakia, which may allay Soviet and East European fears of Germany, an undercurrent at the Geneva foreign ministers conference (see also *International, Berlin Crisis*). It is also reported that German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer has agreed to establish diplomatic relations with 5 East European satellites.

May 23—The tenth anniversary of the founding of the West German republic is marked by demonstrations for reunification.

May 24—West Germany makes a \$2.4 million settlement to the B'nai B'rith for property losses under the Nazi regime.

GREECE

May 7—Premier Konstantin Karamanlis of Greece arrives in Turkey and begins discussions with Turkish Premier Adnan

Menderes for settling Turk-Greek difficulties. They will also discuss a government for Cyprus.

May 13—The U.S.S.R. tells Greece that permitting Western bases to be established on Greek soil is an act hostile to the Soviet Union.

ICELAND

May 22—A British destroyer rams an Iceland Coast Guard craft in the continuing argument between Britain and Iceland over Iceland's adoption of a 12-mile off-shore fishing limit. The British Navy states that the incident was "an error in seamanship."

May 23—The Icelandic National Committee for the Atlantic Congress of Nato announces that it will not attend the forthcoming congress in London June 5 because of the argument with Britain over fishing rights.

INDONESIA

May 13—It is reported that Army Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Abdul Haris Nasution says rebels in Sumatra and Celebes have made overtures for a peace settlement with the government.

May 14—Sources report that Britain has agreed to sell military equipment to Indonesia.

IRAN

May 5—Shah Mohammed Riza Pahlevi arrives in Great Britain on a visit of state.

May 29—The U.S. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development lends Iran \$72 million for road projects.

IRAQ

May 6—Premier Abdul Karim Kassim, according to a newspaper report, is to head an Economic Planning Board which will oversee the newly reorganized ministries' set-up.

May 11—Great Britain agrees to permit substantial sales of military equipment to Iraq.

May 16—It is reported that Basra has been placed under curfew to curb anti-Russian agitation.

May 23—The Communist party's Political Bureau decides to stop public campaigning for seats in Kassim's government. Kassim states that he wants the Communists to give up political activity and their demand for legal status.

May 25—It is reported by refugee Kurds who fled to Turkey that Kurdish tribesmen along the Iranian-Iraqi-Turkish border are fighting Kassim.

May 30—Premier Abdul Karim Kassim tells Western reporters that the Communists, who have given up demands for legal status for their party, are a "force working for their country."

May 31—The Baghdad radio reports that Premier Kassim met with the Soviet Ambassador for a 2-hour talk.

ISRAEL

May 12—The U.S. loans Israel \$5 million for industrial development.

May 13—Israel celebrates its eleventh year of independence.

May 27—Israeli planes bring down a Lebanese light bomber which they charge was on a photographic mission along the Israeli border.

May 29—Avraham Harman is named to succeed Abba Eban as Israeli Ambassador to the U.S.

ITALY

May 6—Italian President Giovanni Gronchi makes his first call on Pope John XXIII.

JAPAN

May 2—Japanese Red Cross authorities propose to North Korean Red Cross officials that a North Korean delegation should take back those Koreans in Japan who wish to be repatriated to North Korea. Japan has stopped insisting that the International Red Cross screen applicants for repatriation to North Korea.

JORDAN

May 5—Premier Samir el-Rifai resigns. A new Cabinet is formed by Minister of Court Hazza Majali.

May 6—Majali's new Cabinet is sworn in.

May 13—Jordan agrees to the Arab League's suggestion for an Arab summit conference on the Palestine question.

KOREA (See *Japan*.)

LAOS

May 17—A battalion of 750 Pathet Lao (Communist) followers surrenders to the Laotian army.

May 24—It is reported that the Army has clashed with the last rebel Pathet Lao battalion of 800 men.

LIBERIA

May 6—President William V. S. Tubman is elected for another 4-year term.

MOROCCO

May 6—Forty Spaniards, prisoners since 1957, are returned to the Spanish government. King Mohammed V reasserts Morocco's right to the Spanish enclave at Ifni.

May 8—Spain releases Moroccan prisoners held since the 1957 revolt.

NEPAL

May 27—Nepal's first elected government, under the new premier and Congress party leader B. P. Koirala, is sworn in by King Mahendra.

May 28—Koirala asserts a policy of "strict neutrality" in foreign affairs.

NETHERLANDS, THE

May 19—The 68-day government crisis is settled: Professor Jan Eduard de Quay, the new premier, and his coalition Cabinet are sworn in. For the first time since World War II, the Labor (Socialist) party is excluded from the government. De Quay's Catholic Peoples party receives 6 Cabinet posts; the remaining 7 seats are divided among three other parties on a 3-2-2 split.

NICARAGUA

May 30—To ward off general unrest that might shape into a national strike, President Luis A. Somoza Debayle imposes limited martial law throughout the country. Of 50 persons arrested, some 30 are being detained by jailors.

PANAMA

May 1—An official of the O.A.S. (Organization of American States) announces the surrender of the 87-man invasion force which entered Panama last week.

PARAGUAY

May 30—President Alfredo Stroessner, who lifted a 12-year state of siege April 28, restores it after dissolving the Chamber of Deputies.

PERU

May 16—Constitutional guarantees are suspended for another 30 days because of the continuing bank strike.

May 26—A 13 per cent wage increase brings to an end the 54-day old bank strike.

May 28—Fernando Belaunde Terry and other top leaders of the Popular Action party are arrested en route to Arequipa where they planned to stage a mass rally next week in direct defiance of a government prohibition on such meetings.

PHILIPPINES, THE

May 21—The Philippine Congress adjourns after approving the government's 1,250,000,000 peso budget. The President announces that he is calling a special session to meet until June 1, so that Congress may reconsider his demand for placing an exchange margin on the peso (in effect a tax on foreign exchange).

POLAND

May 31—Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki declares that Western recognition of the Oder-Neisse line as the Polish-German border would promote peace in Europe.

SPAIN

May 2—Prince Juan Carlos, Generalissimo Francisco Franco's hand-picked successor, is sworn in as president of the Spanish Chapter of the Sovereign Military Order of Malta.

May 3—Prince Juan Carlos marches in a parade celebrating Spain's military strength.

May 14—It is announced by a spokesman that a liberal Catholic group has formed the Christian Democratic Left party in opposition to the government's ban outlawing all political parties except the Falange. The new party stands opposed to Franco's rule.

SWEDEN

May 14—The parliament passes an old age pension increase raising payments from 10 per cent to two-thirds of an individual's income.

TIBET

May 7—The Panchen Lama meets with Communist Chinese party chief Mao Tse-tung in Peking.

May 8—Tibetan farmers are told by the Communist Chinese Military Commission in Tibet that they may keep all their produce and public grain, and not pay taxes, according to a New China (*Hsinhua*) news report.

May 10—An Indian source reports that Russian troops are helping Communist Chinese to quell the Khamba tribes' revolt in Tibet.

May 12—Some 11,500 Tibetans are estimated to have taken refuge in India and Bhutan since the March uprising.

TUNISIA

May 27—The French Army declares that yesterday its troops entered Tunisian border areas while engaged in a clash with Algerian rebels. According to a French spokesman, the army was not pursuing the rebels, but crossed the border only to cut off the rebels' retreat.

May 28—Tunisia declares that French troop movement yesterday did not impair Franco-Tunisian unity.

TURKEY

May 9—Greek Premier Konstantin Karamanlis and Turkish Premier Adnan Menderes reach "full accord" after a 3-day talk to settle their differences. Final settlement will not be reached until Turkish officials repay the Greeks' visit.

U.S.S.R., THE (See also *International, Berlin Crisis.*)

May 10—A Soviet census report is issued listing a population figure of 208,800,000.

May 11—Premier Khrushchev tells farmers in Kiev, on his visit through farmlands, that they must become more efficient, and obtain greater production with less labor.

May 12—Harvard University (U.S.) confirms that it has agreed to exchange professors with Leningrad State University.

It is reported that the Soviet Union has ordered a national inventory of Russia's industrial plant, with equipment to be listed by "price and value."

May 24—The Soviet Union and Britain sign a trade agreement for a 5-year period, under which British purchases in the U.S.S.R. will increase one third (from £57 million in 1958 to £80 million), and Soviet purchases from Britain even more (£25-30 million in 1958).

May 25—Premier Khrushchev departs for a 12-day visit to Albania (see also *Albania*).

May 26—It is reported that Aleksei I. Adzhubei has been appointed editor of *Izvestia*. Adzhubei was former editor of *Kom-*

somolskaya Pravda, and was responsible for its increased circulation among Soviet youth.

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

May 11—President of the World Bank Eugene R. Black ends talks in Cairo with U.A.R. officials. One of the topics under discussion was a loan for widening the Suez Canal.

U.A.R. President Gamal Abdel Nasser names Lieutenant General Mohammed Ibrahim Minister of War. Lieutenant General Aly Amer succeeds to the new minister's former post, army chief of staff.

May 26—According to a Cairo governmental source, the World Bank has offered to advance part of a \$40 million loan for improving the Suez Canal.

UNITED STATES

Agriculture

May 29—Pressured by New Jersey poultry interests, Secretary of Agriculture Ezra Taft Benson restudies his refusal to subsidize the egg and poultry farmers.

May 30—Wisconsin Democrat Lester R. Johnson, chairman of the House Committee on Agriculture's subcommittee on poultry, reveals plans to hold hearings June 17 and June 18 on the possibility of subsidy aid to poultry and egg farmers.

The Economy

May 11—The Government reports that available jobs increased and unemployment decreased in the period between mid-March and mid-April; the change was double the seasonal expectation.

May 22—The Consumer Price Index returned to a record high in mid-April, reports the Department of Labor.

Foreign Policy

May 2—It is reported in Washington that in the past two weeks \$179 million in gold has flowed from the United States.

May 4—Former British Prime Minister Sir Winston Churchill begins a 3-day visit with U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower.

May 9—After a 3-day meeting, U.S. ambassadors serving in 10 South American republics report that communism is making an "intensified effort" to undermine pan-American unity.

May 11—The President urges Congress to approve U.S. membership in a development bank and development fund for Latin America.

President Eisenhower welcomes Belgian King Baudouin in Washington.

The U.S. and the International Atomic Energy Agency sign an agreement in Vienna providing for cooperation in the civil use of atomic energy.

May 19—Foreign correspondent Vincent Sheean gets a passport valid for Communist China; he plans to set up a news bureau for the Westinghouse Broadcasting Company.

The President submits two executive agreements on atomic power to Congress; one provides for help for France in the development of an atomic submarine; the other for help in developing British atomic weapons.

May 26—The President asks Congress to approve agreements strengthening 4 NATO nations—Canada, the Netherlands, West Germany and Turkey—by allowing the U.S. to give them information and equipment about nuclear weapons. Unless Congress disapproves these agreements by concurrent resolution they will go into effect automatically in 60 days. The Greek agreement is not submitted at this time.

May 29—Adlai E. Stevenson, Democratic candidate for the presidency in 1952 and 1956, says that the difference in living standards between industrialized and underdeveloped nations is "the most important and fateful fact in the world today." Speaking at McGill University in Canada, he asks that nation to join the U.S. to "face the rising claims of the vast majority of mankind."

Government

May 1—Clare Boothe Luce resigns as Ambassador to Brazil.

The General Accounting Office reports that the Air Force has spent more on the Air Force Academy at Colorado Springs than was authorized by Congress.

May 5—Voting 70 to 17, the Senate confirms Potter Stewart as a justice of the Supreme Court.

May 7—Lewis L. Strauss says that as chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission he "never knowingly, willfully and deliberately withheld any information" from the

Joint Congressional Atomic Energy Committee, in a statement at the long-drawn-out hearing on his nomination as Secretary of Commerce.

May 13—The President, in a special message, asks Congress for speedy action on the interstate highway program, the home building program and the wheat surplus problem.

May 14—The Senate Commerce Committee ends hearings on Lewis L. Strauss.

The Senate passes an emergency money bill granting an additional \$150 million for loan funds to underdeveloped nations.

May 15—The Census Bureau reveals that because Alaska and Hawaii have become states the center of the nation's population has moved 17 miles westward to a point about 3 miles northeast of Louisville, Illinois.

May 19—The Senate Commerce Committee votes 9 to 8 to confirm Lewis L. Strauss as Secretary of Commerce.

May 20—The Justice Department completes its program to restore citizenship to Japanese-Americans who renounced their citizenship after being placed in detention camps during World War II.

President Eisenhower awards the Medal of Freedom to John Foster Dulles at Walter Reed Hospital.

May 21—The House votes 261 to 160 to pass a liberal omnibus housing bill despite a threat of presidential veto.

May 24—John Foster Dulles dies of cancer at the age of 71.

May 28—James R. Killian, Jr. resigns as the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology. Eisenhower names George Bogdan Kistiakowsky, now professor of chemistry at Harvard University, to replace him.

John M. Cabot's nomination as Ambassador to Brazil is confirmed by the Senate.

May 30—Louisiana's Governor Earl K. Long is hospitalized under psychiatric care after two intemperate outbursts last week in the state legislature.

Labor

May 2—The National Labor Relations Board rules against a partial lockout by an employer to prevent employees from collecting unemployment compensation.

May 5—Nine New York and New Jersey newspaper distributors refuse to reveal

whether or not they systematically paid off officials of the Newspaper and Mail Deliverers Union, in hearings before the Senate rackets committee.

President Eisenhower says that if steel labor and management fail in contract negotiations the government cannot "stand still and do nothing."

May 6—Executives from *The New York Times* and *The New York Daily Mirror* reveal that in 1948 their newspapers paid thousands of dollars in tribute to union officials to see that newspaper deliveries were not blocked.

A spokesman for the 12 major steel producers reveals that the industry is considering a profit sharing pact to provide mutual aid in the event of a strike.

May 7—The United Steelworkers of America ask a federal investigation of possible conspiracy to violate anti-trust legislation by 12 steel producers.

May 8—A strike by nonprofessional employees at six private hospitals in New York city begins.

May 10—The International Ladies Garment Workers Union (I.L.G.W.U.) plans a \$5 million strike fund, ending traditional opposition to strikes.

May 13—President of the United Mine Workers John L. Lewis tells subcommittees of the House Education and Labor Committee to forget about all labor reform legislation, which he views as a weapon of the rich to oppress the poor.

May 24—Negro and Puerto Rican organizations stage mass demonstrations against New York hospitals where nonprofessional employees continue to strike; it is charged that these hospitals pay Negro and Puerto Rican help "sweatshop wages."

Military Policy

May 5—The Atomic Energy Commission reveals that the U.S. and Great Britain have added almost 3 times as much radioactive debris to the atmosphere in weapons testing as the U.S.S.R.

President Eisenhower officially names William B. Franke to succeed Thomas S. Gates as Secretary of the Navy on July 1.

May 6—The National Aeronautics and Space Administration orders the development of a space rocket that could be manned weighing more than 147 tons; the

contract for the rocket goes to the General Dynamics Corporation.

May 7—General Clyde D. Eddleman, commander of the U.S. Army in Europe, says that there would be no strategic or tactical disadvantage to the West if all military forces were disengaged in Central Europe.

The White House announces that Lieutenant General Emmet O'Donnell will be commander-in-chief of the Pacific Air Forces.

May 8—Deputy Secretary of Defense Donald A. Quarles dies unexpectedly.

Willard F. Libby of the A.E.C. urges nuclear weapons testing in outer space to cut down on radioactive fall-out.

May 11—The Air Force discloses current factory production of a new rocket fuel, liquid hydrogen, with 3 times the energy of older types of fuel.

May 14—The Department of Defense reveals that a cancerous growth in General Twining's left lung has been removed; he is reported to be making very satisfactory progress and to plan to return to his desk in 5 or 6 weeks. Twining is chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

May 18—The President names Thomas S. Gates, Jr. as Deputy Secretary of Defense replacing the late Donald A. Quarles.

May 19—Defense Secretary Neil H. McElroy says he has suspended plans to resign in the fall, because of the death of Donald A. Quarles.

May 20—Controller General Joseph Campbell charges that the Boeing Airplane Company submitted overpriced bids on B-52 bomber parts; the bids were \$5 million too high and the company knew it, according to Campbell. Other aircraft companies accused of willful overcharging are Lockheed Aircraft, Cessna Aircraft and Engineering and Plastics Company.

May 22—The General Accounting Office says that McDonnell Aircraft Corporation overpriced a contract by almost \$5.2 million.

Benjamin O. Davis, Jr., of the Air Force, is nominated to become a major general; if confirmed, he will be the first Negro ever to hold this rank in any service.

May 28—Two monkeys are shot 300 miles into space in a Jupiter rocket and are recovered unharmed after a long distance flight 1700 miles away in the Caribbean.

May 30—In Washington, more than 50

newsmen see the monkeys Able and Baker. As far as Americans know, they are the first healthy survivors of a long-distance rocket flight in outer space.

The Supreme Court

May 4—The Supreme Court holds that unless questions asked by a state legislative committee are clearly relevant to the official subject of inquiry, a witness refusing to answer cannot be held in contempt. The decision is unanimous. In question is a case involving a Virginia legislative committee investigating race relations.

Voting 5 to 4, the Court holds that health inspectors entering a private home without a warrant to check sanitary conditions are not in violation of the fourth amendment.

The Court refuses to hear a case involving the exclusion of three Negro doctors from a private Wilmington (N.C.) hospital because the fourteenth amendment, in the opinion of the Court, does not apply to "purely private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful."

May 25—In a 2-line order, the Court says a Louisiana ban on Negro-white boxing matches is unconstitutional.

VATICAN, THE

May 1—Pope John XXIII tells Roman Catholic laborers to shun collaboration with Communists in seeking labor benefits.

May 16—Pope John names a 12-man committee to organize the projected international conference of Roman Catholic churches.

May 25—Cardinal Copello is sworn in as Chancellor of the Holy Roman Church.

VIETNAM, SOUTH

May 15—Japan and Vietnam sign an agreement whereby Vietnam will receive \$39 million in war reparations over a 5-year period.

YEMEN

May 18—A Yemeni broadcast reports that it will send a delegation to negotiate its differences with the British protectorate of Aden.

YUGOSLAVIA

May 12—It is revealed that U.A.R. Foreign Minister Mahmoud Fawzi held secret talks yesterday with Yugoslav Foreign Minister General Koca Popovic.

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